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Abstract
I present a Bayesian forecasting model particularly suited for multiparty systems. The
method I develop systematically combines (i) information from a Multinomial logit regres-
sion model fitted on historical data and (ii) estimates of current party support produced
by a Dynamic Linear Model for multinomial observations. I apply the method to the
Norwegian multiparty system, and assess the performance of the model on past elections.
As of present, the model is ready to be updated as the Norwegian parliamentary elections
of 2013 draws closer. The current forecast for the upcoming election is that the four
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1Introduction
Predicting the outcome of political events is an integral part of the practice and study
of politics. In the social sciences pure prediction models are only applied to a limited
number of problems, of which predicting the outcome of elections is one. What these
models for predicting the outcome of elections have in common is that they are developed
for political systems with two candidates or two parties competing. Multiparty political
systems, the most common form of political system among the democratic countries of
the world, have only received scarce attention (Clark et al., 2013, 578). In this thesis my
aim is to rectify this deficiency by constructing a prediction model particularly suited for
the case of a multiparty political system. With this model I generate predictions for the
Norwegian parliamentary elections of 2013.
By way of developing a prediction model for elections in multiparty systems I am
in fact working with a model suited for a specific class of prediction problems with a
wide range of potential applications: The class of prediction problems that consists of
predicting the future realizations of an unobservable (latent) variable. In order to predict
the future course of an unobservable variable it is an advantage to know something about
its location today. Translated to the problem at hand, this means that precise estimates
of the current level of support for all the political parties in a multiparty system is
essential for predicting the future level of support for these parties. Therefore, in a first
part I develop a model for tracking party support on a day-to-day basis particularly
adapted to the case of a multiparty political system. Experience from countries with
examples of successful prediction models shows that elections are predictable from political
and economic fundamentals (Lock and Gelman, 2010). Consequently, in a second part I
estimate a model and use these estimates to generate a prediction that is solely based
on political and economic variables. Finally, I combine the information provided by the
1
2 1. INTRODUCTION
two models to produce a forecast for the Norwegian parliamentary election of 2013. The
forecasts produced by this model can be continuously updated as election day draws
closer. As of May 21. this year my prediction is that the four opposition parties win a
majority of the seats in parliament with a probability of 0.775.1
1.1 Aim of the thesis
Prediction is at the core of all fields of science. The successive realizations of a prediction
is a fundamental criterion by which to judge the validity of a scientific model, and it is
by basing our decisions on the models that pass this test that we approach the world in a
rational manner. As noted by Hempel, the same holds for explanations, they are only fully
adequate if their explanans could have served as a basis for predicting the phenomenon
under study (1948, 138). Carnap, one of the founders of the Vienna circle, also arrived at
this definition for scientific explanations, and judged the explanations that lack predictive
capability as not being explanations at all (2006, 565). In the social sciences this point
has recently been reiterated by Schrodt (2010, 565), who attacks the notion that explana-
tion does not imply prediction, a claim that according to him is widespread among social
scientists. Although not concerned with explanation per se, this thesis develops and im-
proves methodology that can be used for testing the predictive capability of explanations.
This thesis is concerned with prediction problems of a particular kind, namely those that
try to predict the future realization of an unobservable (latent) variable. Many social and
political phenomena are of this kind, their true value is unknown to us until they take on
one of a limited number of values. For clarity of exposition I divide these variables into
three (not exhaustive nor exclusive) types. First, there are the phenomena that are only
observable, for practical or for more substantive reasons, in a limited number of its states.
By ”states” I mean the conditions that a given phenomena can exist in. Second, there
are the variables that are only measured at certain intervals of time, so that the values
they take on in the intervening time is unknown. Third comes the variables whose current
value are only determined with a certain delay. Examples of the first type of phenomena
differ in whether their unobservability are due to practical or more substantial reasons. If
one is looking at a wall with three windows and a person inside: the whereabouts of the
person (the value of the location variable) is only revealed to us when she appears behind
1The seven parties currently represented in the Norwegian parliament are Arbeiderpartiet (Ap), Sosial-
istisk Venstreparti (Sv), Senterpartiet (Sp), Kristelig folkeparti (Krf), Venstre (V), Høyre (H) and Frem-
skrittspartiet (Frp). The three first of these have since 2005 been coalition partners in the Red-Green
coalition. When I refer to the opposition, I mean the four latter parties on this list. Through the entire
thesis I use the Norwegian names for these parties and their abbreviations interchangeably.
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one of the windows. In the meantime we can only guess at her location based on which
window we last saw her appear behind. Here it is the practical obstacles due to an apart-
ment’s limited number of windows that makes the location variable partly unobservable.
In other cases the unobservability is less due to practicalities. Consider the stereotypical
study of the civil war literature that has as its dependent variable a dichotomous measure
taking the value one if civil war is observed and zero otherwise. If, as one can argue, civil
war is not an either-or phenomenon and the observed outcomes are just the ends of a
continuum where the actual variable of interest is, perhaps, political instability, then the
observable dichotomous variable is in fact generated by another variable that civil war
is an easily observable expression of. As this first type of latent variables is presented
here, in both examples there is in fact a latent variable y∗ ranging from a to b (where a
and b might be minus and plus infinity) that generates the observed values, the y’s. In
the case of civil war, the units with y∗ larger than some threshold are observed as y = 1
while those below the threshold are observed as y = 0 (Long, 1997, 40). In the windows
example the observation y can only take on as many values as there are windows, while
y∗, the unobservable position in between the windows is continuous and possibly infinite.
The second type of latent variables are best thought of as variables with missing values
at most points in time. Sometimes missing data points can be caused by poor statistical
reporting, a common problem when working with aggregated national level data. In other
situations, the lack of observations is inherent to the phenomenon under study. The latter
is the case if measurement follows a pattern or is associated with certain dates, but the
variable evolves in between measurements. Support for poltical parties, which is only re-
ally measured on election day, is a case in point. In cases like this the variable of interest is
a time series {yt} for which we, for example, only have observations at t = 1, 101, 201, . . .
and so on, where t might be days, years etc..2
Finally, I place the variables that are only determined with a certain delay in the last
category. These are often composite variables that demand extensive data collection to
actually measure. A country’s gross domestic product (GDP) is a pertinent example of
such a variable. Normally, precise measures of a country’s GDP are determined with
a delay of several months. To know the current level of activity in the economy is in-
formation that policymakers and investors need to make decisions, and economists have
termed the expression ”nowcasting” to the task of estimating the size of GDP in real-time
(Giannone et al., 2008).
2In the case of political elections one objection can be reaised to this expose´. One can argue that
intending to do something, vote for a given party, is something qualitatively different from actually doing
it.
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For these three types of unobservable variables one thing is clear: If one seeks to make
forecasts of future values (or realizations) of a latent variable, a good estimate of its cur-
rent value is advantageous. The point is that a good estimate of its unobservable value
is likely to provide for better forecasts than only knowledge of its observable value (i.e.
zero or one), or its last observed value (i.e its value last month). To continue with one of
the examples above. Given that one wants to make statements about the chances of civil
war occuring at future points in time, one probably wants to know something about the
current value of the latent variable. It is an advantage, but certainly not optimal to only
know whether the country in question presently is a zero or a one, that is whether or not
the country suffers a civil war. In order to make good forecasts one has to know something
about the risk of civil war occurring (Hegre et al., 2012, 3). And risk is, in effect, the
name that we put on the unobservable variable that generates the observed outcomes, war
and peace. To summarize, common for this general kind of prediction problems is that
one is dealing with two unknowns: The future realization of the latent variable is clearly
unknown, and the present value of the latent variable is also, for various reasons, unknown.
In this thesis I develop a model that attempts to handle one instance of this general
class of prediciton problems: namely the problem of forecasting the outcome of political
elections. Election forecasting is, for two reasons, a good field for the development of
such models. First, the level of support for a given party by the next election is clearly
unknown, and the level of support for a party today is also for practical reasons an un-
observable quantity. Since we have little reason to believe that the support for political
parties is invariant between to elections, only to change on election day, support for po-
litical parties is a variable with missing values at most points in time. It belongs to the
second type of latent variables I outlined above. Second, as with many latent variables,
I do actually have measurements of the variable of interest, but the measurements (the
political polls) are inaccurate and errorprone.
Models for forecasting the outcome of elections are not novel and several have been uti-
lized with success. In the next chapter I provide an overview of the literature on election
forecasting and place the models developed in this literature in four different categories,
depending on the theoretical approach or the model applied. What the contributions in
these four categories have in common is that none are particularly adapted to forecasting
the outcome of elections in multiparty systems, they are all developed for political sys-
tems with two presidential candidates or two political parties/blocs competing for power.
Thus, when attempting to construct a model fit for the dual task of of making inferences
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on the latent value of party support in between elections and forecasting the outcome of
elections in multiparty systems, one is faced with challenges that relate to theoretical as
well as statistical issues. In this thesis I attempt to do something with the latter. To this
end I adopt the following strategy. First, I assess how a model that have been used to
track the evolution of voter sentiment in presidential and two-party/bloc systems works
when applied to the Norwegian multiparty system. Second, I develop another model for
the same task that is based on other distributional assumptions that are more sound
when tracking the support for parties in a multiparty system. Both of these models are
estimated with political polling data exclusively. Third, I draw on arguments put for-
ward in the literature I review below to build a model for forecasting the outcome of
elections in multiparty systems. Finally, the information provided by these two models
is combined to produce predictions for the election outcome of the seven main political
parties in Norway, and these predictions are in turn translated to actual seats in parlia-
ment. In all of the steps outlined above I rely on Bayesian statistical methods, a branch
of statistics that I show, lends itself naturally to the problem at hand. The methods I use
for forecasting elections are applicable in all multiparty political systems, not only the
Norwegian, and in the conclusion I outline possible extensions and ameliorations of the
models in further research. When it comes to the application in this thesis, the Norwegian
parliamentary elections of 2013, I find that the result of this election will most probably
be an alternation in government. The parties of the Red-Green coalition, Arbeiderpar-
tiet, Sosialistisk Venstreparti and Senterpartiet, are predicted to receive 30.3%, 6.6% and
5.8% ([28.8%, 31.8%], [5.8%, 7.4%] and [5.1%, 6.6%] are the 95% confidence intervals) of
the votes respectively and consequently lose seven seats in parliament with a total of 79
seats. The opposition parties of Kristelig folkeparti, Venstre, Høyre and Fremskrittspar-
tiet, on the other hand, are predicted to obtain 6.8%, 4.7%, 25.1% and 16.3% ([6%, 7.6%],
[4.1%, 5.5%], [23.7%, 26.6%] and [15.1%, 17.6%] are the 95% confidence intervals) of the
votes respectively and receive a total of 87 seats.3 In addition, the category of parties I
call ”others” have a mean prediction of 3 seats. As of May 21. the predicted probability
of the opposition passing the majority mark of 85 seats is 0.775.
1.2 Outline
Election forecasting is a developed art in a handful of democratic countries. In Chapter 2
I present some of the most important contributions in this field, with special attention
3To be precise, the uncertainty estimates are not confidence intervals, but highest density regions
(HDRs). HDRs will be defined in Section 3.3.
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paid to their relevance for the problem at hand. The central part of this thesis is the
development of a model for forecasting elections in multiparty systems. Two important
ingredients of this model are political polls and Bayesian methods. Therefore, before I
proceed to the main part of the thesis, I provide a general introduction to both topics
in Chapter 3. The forecast model of this thesis consists of two parts and I present
them separately. In Chapter 4 I present the Dynamic Linear Models (DLMs) that I
use to make inferences about the latent level of current party support. In Section 4.1
I introduce the DLM used by Jackman (2005) and Beck et al. (2006) to track party
support and presidential approval in a two-bloc and a presidential system. I elaborate
on the potential problems with applying this model to a multiparty system such as the
Norwegian. Thereafter, in Section 4.2, the second part of the DLM chapter, I develop
a model that is theoretically sound for modeling the distribution of support among the
parties in a multiparty system. With these two models I use polling data to track party
support in Norway from 1997 until present and estimate the possible bias of individual
polling institutes. Finally, the two DLMs are compared and their estimates are presented
in a series of graphs. In Chapter 5 the forecasting part of the forecast model is developed.
I present two methods for predicting election outcomes. The first is a simple method for
extrapolating the time series estimated by the DLM, while the second method combines
predictions generated on the basis political and economic variables and combine these with
estimates from the DLM. Since both methods produce predictions of the national votes
shares of individual parties, the chapter begins with a section on the Norwegian electoral
system and on my strategy for getting from estimates of a party’s national vote share
to its actual number of seats in parliament. Both methods are tested out-of-sample on
previous elections. In Section 5.5, I present my forecast for the Norwegian parliamentary
election of September 2013. Finally, in Chapter 6 I conclude with a discussion of possible
extensions and improvements of the model of this thesis.
2State of the art and research gaps
With minor expections Norwegian elections have not been subject to attempts at fore-
casting using rigorous methods. Certainly, political pundits as well as political scientists
make statements about the outcome of the next election, but seldom if ever, do these
predictions come with an estimate of uncertainty attached to it. Furthermore, the pieces
of information that these forecasts are based upon (polls combined with general knowl-
edge about Norwegian history and politics) are seldom, if ever, combined in a manner
consistent with the laws of probability. Arnesen (2012a) provides the first systematic
attempt at constructing models for forecasting the outcome of Norwegian parliamentary
elections. The situation is different in other advanced democracies, such as the United
States, the United Kingdom, and France, where election forecasting is quite common. In
this section I provide a review of the approaches utilized in election forecasting in these
three countries, and discuss if and how these models are tranferable to the Norwegian
case. Broadly defined, when it comes to the methodology utilized, the models can be
grouped into four categories: (i) economic vote models; (ii) electoral cycles models; (iii)
models usings prediction markets; and (iv) models that use political polls as their primary
source of data.
2.1 Economic voting
Most of the models developed for the US, the UK, and France combine economic vari-
abels such as GDP growth, unemployment figures and inflation with an incumbency
dummy and some measure of governmental approval. These forecast models draw their
theoretical underpinnings from the field of economic voting, a field that according to
Lewis-Beck and Paldam (2000, 113) ”mixes economics and political science [. . . ] by the
7
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means of econometrics”. Studies in this tradition rests on the responsibility hypoth-
esis, according to which voters hold the government responsible for economic events
(Lewis-Beck and Paldam, 2000, 114).1 In simple terms, if economic times are bad the
voters are expected to turn their back on the incumbents. Foucault and Nadeau (2012)
is a recent example of an economic vote model, developed for foreasting the French
presidential election of May 2012. In accordance with the responsibility hypothesis
Foucault and Nadeau state that the now former president Nicolas Sarkozy was likely to
be held accountable for the poor performance of the French economy (2012, 218). And in-
deed, the model of Foucault and Nadeau did sucessfully predict the defeat of Sarkozy, and
the victory of the current president Franc¸ois Hollande. The model of Foucault and Nadeau
is illustrative of the two main assumptions of the economic vote literature, which they state
clearly. The first assumption is that the electoral outcomes can be satisfactory explained
by a limited number of economic and political variables. Second, that the values taken
by these variables several months in advance of the elections often are more useful for
predicting elections than information picked closer to election day (Foucault and Nadeau,
2012, 219). The latter assumption can be empirically investigated, but the contributions
that systematically investigate the optimal lag-structure are rare or non-existent (I have
not found any). For example, in their forecast model for the French presidential elections
Nadeau et al. (2010, 12) choose a six months lag on the independent variables, a choice
that they base ”partly on theory and partly on empirics”, with no further justification.
Generally, the important point here is that since the forecasts based on economic vote
models are made several months in advance of the election, information of interest that
appears between the forecast date and election day is not incorporated into the models.
That is, in most instances the forecasts are not systematically updated as election day
nears. Below, I present one exception to this general pattern, and in Chapter 5.3 I develop
an economic vote model that can be continously updated as election day nears.
A good defense of economic vote models is found in Bartels and Zaller (2001). They
examine the Al Gore vs George Bush 2000 US presidential election that promted many
analysts and political scientists to cast doubt on the basic premise of economic vote mod-
els, that economic and political factors play a systematic and largely predictable role
in shaping the presidential election outcomes (Bartels and Zaller, 2001, 9). The reason
for this was that GDP had been growing at a steady rate in the year leading up to the
2000 election, and that the incumbent president Bill Clinton (a Democrat as Gore) was
highly popular. Given these two facts, Gore was expected to win comfortably, and his
1Lewis-Beck and Paldam (2000) and Nannestad and Paldam (1994) provide good reviews of the lit-
erature in this tradition.
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failure to do so was in turn imputed on Gore’s personality and his efforts during the cam-
paign. Bartels and Zaller (2001) conduct a meta-analysis of 48 regression models from
the economic vote literature to examine whether the 2000 US election really refutes the
fundamental premises of the theory. They conclude that, rather than refuting the theory,
the presidential election of 2000 was largerly in line with what the theory predicts. First,
they find that even though the GDP had been growing, the real disposable income (RDI)
per capita of 2000 was below the post-war average. Importantly, by the meta-analysis
they find the rate of RDI per capita growth to be a more accurate predictor of presidential
election outcomes than GDP growth (Bartels and Zaller, 2001, 10). Second, the fact that
Clinton had served not one, but two terms, caused a certain fatigue with the incumbent
party that counted negatively for Gore. These two variables both belong to what is called
political and economic fundamentals in the economic vote literature, and taken into ac-
count Gore did in fact as well as one would expect (Bartels and Zaller, 2001, 10). To
summarize, the point that Bartels and Zaller convey is that appeals to election-specific
explanations of the 2000 election are misplaced, and that the economic vote theory fare
well in face of the outcome of the 2000 US elections (Bartels and Zaller, 2001, 18).
An important limitation with the economic vote models derived from the responsability
hypothesis is that it is not evident what this kind of models should look like for multiparty
systems with changing coalition partners in government. Nannestad and Paldam (1994,
213) go as far as stating that such models only work in two party/bloc systems. This
causes no problems for economic vote models built to forecast presidential elections in
the US and France, as well as parliamentary elections in the UK, but application of the
economic voting scheme on the Norwegian political system is not straightforward. In his
article on economic voting in Norway Arnesen (2012b) draws on a branch of the economic
vote theory that does not relate solely to the performance of the government, but em-
phasizes how parties at different ends of the political spectrum maintain issue-ownership
over different economic domains, and thereby benefit from varying economic conditions
(Carlsen, 2000; Hibbs, 1977; Petrocik, 1996; Swank, 1993). According to the clientele hy-
pothesis of this theory, growing unemployment and low economic growth favours the left,
while a prospering economy and a low unemployment is to the advantage of the parties
of the right (Arnesen, 2012b, 4). To test this hypothesis on the case of Norway Arnesen
argues that, for analytical purposes, it is fair to pool the Norwegian political parties in
two blocs, the left and the right (2012b, 7). With this division at hand Arnesen runs
regression models that cover the national and the local elections from the first post-war
election in 1945 until the last election of 2009, and his findings are in line with the clien-
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tele hypothesis: the aggregate vote for the parties on the left of the ideological spectrum
increases when citizens fear for their jobs (2012b, 18). Pooling the parties can indeed
be a good strategy for analytical purposes, for the purpose of predicting the outcome of
elections there are, however, some weaknesses with this approach. First, problems occur
if there exists parties that cannot be neatly placed in one bloc or the other. In Norway,
Senterpartiet (Sp) who made a switch to the left bloc before the election of 2005 is a case
in point. To tackle this issue Arnesen (2012b) excludes this party from the analysis. But,
given that the Red-Green coalition, which includes Sp, is aiming for re-election in 2013 the
exlusion of Sp makes the model unapt for forecasting. Second, the model is asymmetric
in the sense that one minus the left bloc share does not equal right bloc share. This is
due to the fact that one has seen centrist coalitions in Norway (in 1972-1973 and in 1997-
2000), and in the event of a Red-Green defeat in the 2013 election, it is not clear which
parties will form the new coalition. Third, and most importantly, as I show in Section 5.1,
the conversion from national vote shares to seats in parliament is not one-to-one in the
Norwegian electoral system. Therefore, precise forecast estimates of the support for each
individual party is needed in order for a forecast to be a good forecast. This means that
an economic vote model must say something about the effects of political and economic
conditions on each individual party (that it is worth considering). A general statement
about what will happen to ”the left” given some economic indicators is not sufficient.
2.2 Electoral cycles
Inherent in the concept of democracy is alternation. As Norpoth (1991) remarks, ”as
long as people have chosen political leaders through some form of election, it has been
noted, almost like a law of politics, that popularity diminishes with time in office.”
Nannestad and Paldam (1994) estimate that it costs the average government 2 percent of
the vote to rule. Due to this cost-of-rule effect one should expect to observe some form
of electoral cycles where power is passed from one side of politics to the other in a more
or less regular fashion. Some forecast models estimate and include this cost-of-rule effect.
An original attempt is Lebo and Norpoth (2007, 72) who remarks that ”the swing of the
electoral pendulum is as British as ale and kidney pie”. Even if this is so, they do face
the complicating factor of the period and amplitude of the electoral cycles being irregular.
This excludes the use of a simple sine-function to describe the swings of the electoral pen-
dulum. Instead, Lebo and Norpoth (2007) rely on a second-order autoregressive model
originally developed to track the irregular fluctuations of sunspot observations. In addi-
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tion to the two pendulum coefficients their model only includes one other variable: the
approval rating of the prime minister. With this parsimonious model Lebo and Norpoth
were able to predict that the outcome of the 2010 British election would be a Hung Par-
liament. Another model in the same genre is the time-for-change model developed by
Abramowitz (2008) for presidential elections in the US. This model includes the length of
time that the incumbent president’s party has controlled the White House and a dummy
variable indicating whether a party has controlled the White House for one term or for
two or more terms. The first of these Abramowitz (2008, 692) calls the time-for-change
factor, while the latter is intended to capture the strength of the time-for-change senti-
ment in the electorate (Abramowitz, 2008, 693). With this model Abramowitz predicted
that Barack Obama would receive 54.3% of the major party vote and that John McCain
would receive 45.7% (the actual figures were 53.6% and 46.4%).
2.3 Prediction markets
Prediciton markets are, to my knowledge, only experimented with once in Norway. Arnesen
(2011b) conducted a small scale prediction market experiment prior to the election of
2009. Prediction markets are internet based betting markets where the purpose (for the
researcher) is to use the information content of the market values to make predictions
about future events (Arnesen, 2011a, 45). The idea is twofold. First, contrary to political
polls, that provide estimates of the current political preferences among potential voters,
the information in the prices in a prediction market provides an estimate of the outcome
on election day. Second, given the financial incentive the participants in the market have
to make accurate forecasts, there is considerabe incitement for digging deeper for relevant
information, and not least, not to let oneself be blinded by what one wishes the out-
come to be. In another article where he studies the Iowa Electronic Market (a prediction
market in the US) Arnesen (2011a) corroborates these two ideas. Considering the 2004
and 2008 presidential campaigns the variability of the market predictions are much less
pronounced than that of the polls. Furthermore, the market predictions lie closer to the
actual election result during the whole period under study (Arnesen, 2011a, 53). The
findings from the 2009 experiment in Norway are more mixed. Possible reasons for this is
the limited number of participants in the market, multiparty politics being more difficult
to forecast, and not least, that gambling is illegal in Norway. Lacking the financial in-
centive it is harder to make the case for the rational behaviour of the participants in the
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market. Consequently, the results of the 2009 experiment are inconclusive: they do not
show that prediction markets are superior to other methods of predicting the outcome of
elections in a multiparty system (Arnesen, 2011b).
2.4 Poll based methods
The last branch of the literature that I consider consists of those studies that base their
analysis and forecasts, solely or primarily, on political polling data. Some of these contri-
butions focus less on explicit forecasting, and concentrate instead on locating the level of
current support for political alternatives. In the terms used in the previous section, this
means that focus has been more on determining the level of the latent state today, than
forecasting its realization on election day. Jackman (2005) is an example of such a study,
where a Dynamic Linear Model (DLM) is used to track the latent state of support for
the two blocs during the months leading up to the Australian election of 2004 (the DLM
will be introduced in Chapter 4). His study is conducted after the election and its goal
is to show how one effectively can take advantage of the information conveyed by polls
to measure the bias of each individual polling house and determine the effects of events
occuring during the election campaign. Jackman (2005, 514) finds that the variability in
the estimates provided by the different polling houses is much larger than what can be
explained by random sampling. In addition, he notes that the largest house effects are
associated with the mode of interview. In the same domain is the study by Beck et al.
(2006) of the Bush presidency. The question that the Beck et al. article attempts to an-
swer is: how much did the Katrina debacle (the hurricane that hit New Orleans in August
2005) hurt Bush’s approval (2006, 1). In order to give a precise answer to this question
Beck et al. need a method that can separate out the consequences of Katrina from the
long term decline in Bush’s approval, and single out the true level of the latent variable,
approval of the president, from noisy measurements (political polls) (2006, 2). To handle
this dual challenge Beck et al. use a DLM that they feed polling data and some economic
variables thought to influence the approval of the president. The work is preliminary, and
even with the amount of data they have at hand they find it hard to single out the effects
of Katrina. This is especially so because the hurricane was followed by a quick sucession
of presidential missteps (Beck et al., 2006, 23).
A more explicit poll based attempt at constructing a forecast model for the US is
Lock and Gelman (2010). Since the US presidential elections are decided in swing states,
they argue that one should look at state polls. But state polls are noisy, so one needs a
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method to detect the information that these polls actually do contain. The observation
that even with wide national swings in the support for a candidate the spatial distribution
of support remains fairly stable, leads Lock and Gelman to construct a Bayesian model
that integrates prior data (the 2004 election results) and local level poll data to arrive at
estimates of the position of each state relative to the national popular support for each
candidate (2010, 338). In this manner they are able to determine how much information
a local level poll carries, and thereby use local level polling results to predict the election
outcome in each individual state. The model of Lock and Gelman performs well in fore-
casting previous presidential elections, but in their 2010 article Lock and Gelman do not
apply the model to the 2012 election.
A forecast model for the US that combines insights from three of the branches of the
literature on forecasting elections is Linzer (2012). Linzer introduces a Bayesian fore-
casting model that unifies the regression-based historical forecasting approach (as in the
economic vote and time-for-change models) with the poll-tracking capabilities made fea-
sible by Bayesian models such as those used by Jackman (2005) and Beck et al. (2006).
In fact, what Linzer attempts to resolve is the problem I presented above in connection to
the models of Foucault and Nadeau (2012) and Abramowitz (2008), namely that since the
forecasts based on economic vote models are made several months in advance of election
day, these models do not exploit the information that appears in the time between the
day the forecast is made and election day. Linzer (2012) recognizes that structural models
that predict election outcomes from economic and political fundamentals such as the level
of economic growth, changes in unemployment and whether the incumbent is running for
re-election etc., often provide for accurate forecasts. The deficiency that Linzer seeks to
rectify is that these structural models contain no mechanism for updating predictions
once new information becomes available closer to election day. What Linzer does is that
he uses Bayesian methods to continously update the forecast generated by a structural
model with local level polling data. In this sense, the structural model produces a prior
forecast that is in turn revised by combining it with his estimates of the current latent
level of support for the two candidates. Linzer’s model (see his blog votamatic.org)
correctly predicted the Barack Obama victory in the 2012 US presidential election.
In this brief review I have covered the four main branches of the literature on election
forecasting, with an eye on how theory and modelling strategies can be adopted from
these contributions to the case of a multiparty system. A general feature of this literature
is the penury of models particularly adapted to the multiparty case, and I have pointed
at some of the problems associated with direct application of models built for presidential
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and two-bloc/party political systems to a party system such as the Norwegian. In the
approach I adopt to start alleviate this deficiency of the literature there are two prime
ingredients: political polls and Bayesian methods. Before I proceed to the actual mod-
elling a general discussion of the problem with political polls, and a short introduction to
Bayesian statistics, is due. These two things are the topic of the next chapter.
3Key Ingredients: Political polls and
Bayesian methods
The fundamental ingredients of this thesis are political polls and Bayesian methodology.
In the first part of this chapter I discuss the problems associated with political polls. In a
second part I provide a brief introduction to Bayesian statistics and inference, and show
why Bayesian methods are particularly apt for the problem of making inferences on a
latent variable for which there are only noisy measurements.
3.1 The problem with polls
The most common way of making inferences about the support that a political party
enjoys, is to look at the latest poll. In this section I show why this is a problematic strategy.
There are primarily three issues that limit the usefulness of polls for social scientific
purposes (Jackman, 2005, 500). First, imprecision due to sampling error. Second, the
polling institutes use different methods of interviewing, as well as different weighting
schemes that can potentially induce systematic biases in the estimates. Finally, polls with
rather small samples are not capable of capturing the fine grained day-to-day variations
in voter sentiment. In order to answer questions concerning the effect of a particular
event, precise estimates of these day-to-day swings are necessary. In the following I will
elaborate further on the limits of political polling.
Polling institutes almost always report margins of error. These are most often 95%






















Figure 3.1: Required sample size. The y-axis shows the sample size required to detect a given
percentage point change (x-axis) in voter sentiment. Assuming a baseline level of 50%. The
solid line is 95% CI, dashed lines are 90 and 80% CIs.
Where z0.05/2 = 1.96 in Equation (3.1.1) comes from the fact that a statistic such as αˆ
computed with a large sample follows the normal distribution (Devore and Berk, 2007,
293). If a random variable follows a normal distribution then we expect the mean of 95%
of such samples from the same population to lie within 1.96 standard deviations. From
Equation (3.1.1) we also see that the statistical precision is a function of
√
n, the second
derivative of this function −(4n3/2)−1 highlights the fact that an increase in sample size
produces diminishing marginal returns in statistical precision. The additional cost for
another survey respondent, on the other hand, remains more or less constant. Since the
polling institutes have limited time to conduct their polls and want to make money, it is
natural that the sample sizes remain rather small and the precision limited. Almost all
the polls used in the analysis in this thesis have sample sizes of between 800 and 1000
respondents.1 These sample sizes are too small to detect small but potentially significant
changes in voter sentiment (Jackman, 2005, 501). To illustrate the limits of these sample
sizes Figure 3.1 graphs the sample sizes necessary to detect various percentage point
changes in voter sentiment. By visual inspection it can be seen from the plot that a sample
1For example: average sample sizes between September 2009 and January 2013: Synovate 948 respon-
dents, Gallup 966.4 respondents, and Opinion, Nielsen and Sentio 1000 respondents.
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size of about 60 000 respondents is needed in order to have a 95% chance of detecting a
1 percent change in voter sentiment. Even if with a lower level of statistical significance,
represented by the dashed lines, the researcher will need about around 20 000 respondents
to detect a 1% change. The point is that with the sample sizes that the polling institutes
normally use, we are not able to detect changes in the interval whithin the support for
most parties fluctuate. In order to be able to detect these normal variations larger samples
are clearly necessary.
A typical remedy for insufficient samples is to pool the polls. The most basic way to
pool polls is by taking the average of the estimates. A slightly more sophisticated way
of pooling the polls is to take a precision weighted average (Jackman, 2005, 503). With
a precision weighted estimate one takes into account that the estimates are based on
different sample sizes, and as the name says, one puts more emphasis on those estimates
based on larger samples. If the polling houses Opinion (O) and Gallup (G) provides




where pO = 1/
√
Var(αˆO) and equivalently for Gallup. The standard deviation for the
pooled estimate is then
√
1/(pO + pG), which is clearly smaller that the standard deviation
of any of the two estimates individually.
3.2 House effects
Pooling polls will always result in tighter confidence intervals, but the pooling rests on a
critical assumption: that the polls are unbiased. Beck et al. (2006) and Jackman (2005)
show that in the case of the US and Australia this is not the case. The polls are subject to
bias, and the bias is often specific to each particular polling organization. This is known
as ”house effects”, where ”house” refers to the polling organization. Differences in the
mode of interviewing, the wording of the questions, the time of the day, the sampling
procedures, and the different weighting procedures utilized, all have potential to induce
house specific biases in the estimates. The important point is that pooling several biased
estimates does not in general produce an unbiased estimate.
As an explorative example of the possibility of house effects in the case of Norway,
consider the estimates for the support for Fremskrittspartiet (Frp) provided by five polling
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intitutes from 2009 to the present.2 The typical survey in this period employs a sample
size of n = 1036 respondents, and the average estimate for Frp is about 20%. Under the
assumption that the survey houses employ the same unbiased random sampling procedures
half of the poll results should lie within plus minus 0.67 standard deviations σ, where
σ =
√
.2(1− .2)/n ≈ 0.01. With an estimate of 20% half of the polls with n = 1036
should lie between 19.3% and 20.7%, which gives an average inter-quartile range a little
below two percentage points. The expected inter-quartile range of about two percentage
points holds roughly for all the polls results for Frp. Inspection of the poll results suggests
more dispersion than what is expected under simple random sampling. In 42 of the weeks
in the sample five or more polls are available (which for the sake of this example I accept
as a reasonable number to try to compute an inter-quartile range). In those 42 weeks
the inter-quartile ranges of the polls range from 0.3 to 6.6 percentage points with a mean
of 2.43 percentage points, which is larger than what one would expect under random
sampling assuming, given that the level of support for Frp does not vary much within the
same week. In the more formal analysis in Section 4.4 this suspicion of rather large house
effects in the estimates for Frp is confirmed.
Pooling polls can alleviate one issue of polling, the lack of precision. The problem is
that this strategy assumes that house effects are non-existent. This is in general a risky
strategy since the chances of the two biases cancelling each other out is rather small, and
if the biases run in the same direction the bias will be exaggerated in the pooled estimate,
and one will be falsely more confident about a flawed estimate. The conclusion is that in
order to pool the polls we must have estimates of the bias in each of the polls (Jackman,
2005, 505). This is a challenge, because in order to say something about the bias of each
poll we must know the population quantity that the polls try to estimate, but the whole
point of polling is that this population quantity is unknown. In Chapter 4 I describe how
the house effects are estimated in the framwork of a DLM. The next section gives a brief
introduction to Bayesian statistics, with examples relating to polling data.
3.3 Bayesian analysis: A short intro
Bayesian estimation and inference relies of Bayes Theorem.3 In a general sense, Bayes
Theorem tells us how to rationally update our beliefs in light of data. In political science
these beliefs are most commonly probability statements about parameters, hypotheses
2The exploration of possible house effects is inspired by Beck et al. (2006).
3It is often written ”Bayes’ Theorem” with an apostrophe, because it looks nicer and is common in
the literature I drop the apostrophe.
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and models (Jackman, 2009). Bayes Theorem describes how one’s probability statements
prior to observing data should be revised to updated probability statements after having
observed data. The updated knowledge is then a combination of one’s prior beliefs and
the parameters most likely to have generated the observed data. Usually one says that
prior beliefs become posterior beliefs through the act of observing data, that is
priors→ data→ posterior
Bayes Theorem itself follows directly from the rules of conditional probability. If A1, ..., Ak
are k mutually exlusive events (Ai ∩ Aj = ∅ for all i 6= j), where the union of these
A1∪...∪Ak make up the whole sample space S, and all of these k events have a probability
greater than zero of occurring, that is P (Ai) > 0 for i = 1, ..., k. Then, for any other
event B in S with P (B) > 0




i=1 P (B|Ai)P (Ai)
As an example assume that a woman is interested in the chances of being pregnant after
a single sexual encounter. She buys a test where the text on the package says that the
test correctly classifies 89% of the pregnant woman, but that the test also classifies 15%
of the non-pregnant woman as pregnant. The woman tests positive and remembers that
among her friends one in ten sexual encounters have resulted in pregnancy. By Bayes
Theorem she reasons that
P (preg|T+) = P (T + |preg)P (preg)
P (T + |preg)P (preg) + P (T + |not preg)P (not preg)
=
0.89× 0.1
0.89× 0.1 + 0.15× (1− 0.1) = 0.397
the probability of being pregnant, given the positive test, is 0.397. Perhaps this result
does not satisfy the woman and she decides to take the test one more time. This time
her prior estimate P (preg) = 0.397 equals the posterior estimate she obtained the first
time she applied Bayes Theorem. If she tests positive again, the probability of her being
pregnant is 0.796. A subsequent positive test would yield a probability of 0.956. This
process of continuously updating our beliefs in face of new data highlights an important
aspect of Bayesian statistics: we do not regard the world anew every time we attempt
to answer a given hypothesis, rather we accumulate information such that the posterior
distribution becomes more and more precise (and more precise than the prior and the
20 3. KEY INGREDIENTS: POLITICAL POLLS AND BAYESIAN METHODS
likelihood separately) (Lynch, 2007, 49).
Even though the woman reasons in accordance with the laws of probability, some ob-
jections can be raised. Most evidently, the woman seems a bit too crude in her assessment
of the underlying probability of becoming pregnant after a single sexual encounter. As
her estimate of 1/10 is based on a rather limited sample of friends, she can not be certain
about it. A more rational approach would be if she could say something about the un-
certainty in her estimate, in other words if she could ascribe a probability distribution to
her estimate. This would lead her to Bayes Theorem applied to probability distributions.








with summation for discrete parameters. f(data|θ) = L(θ) is the probability of the
data given the parameters: the likelihood function. The distribution that is obtained by
multiplying the prior and the likelihood is called the posterior distribution. The integral
above is the normalizing constant that ensures that the posterior integrates to one, and it
is often most convenient to drop this one when doing calculations (DeGroot and Schervish,
2012, 391). From this the classic statement of Bayes Theorem follows, namely that the
posterior is proportional to the likelihood times the prior
f(θ|data) ∝ f(data|θ)f(θ) (3.3.2)
To illustrate the use of Bayes Theorem with probability distributions I will consider a poll
published by the polling institute Opinion in December 2009. This poll gave the Red-
Green coalition 38.5% of the vote intentions and had a sample of 1000 respondents (I’ll
call the proportion of Red-Green votes for rg). Knowing that the coalition received 47.8 of
the actual votes on the election day in September 2009, had their support really decreased
by almost 10 percentage points? We might be interested in asserting the probability that
their support was below 40 percent, that is P (rg < .4). In order to answer this question I
will apply Bayes Theorem to obtain a posterior distribution for rg. From Equation 3.3.2
we see that f(poll|rg) and f(rg) need to be specified. The former can be viewed as
a binomial distribution with 385 ”successes” (votes for the coalition) and 1000 − 385







rg385(1− rg)615 ∝ rg385(1− rg)615
To fully specify the Bayesian model the prior distribution f(rg) must be specified. Since
rg is a proportion it is natural to choose a distribution that is only defined on the interval
[0, 1]. The beta distribution is such a distribution. We then get
f(rg|a, b) ∝ rga−1(1− rg)b−1
Specification of the shape parameters a and b reflects my confidence in the prior, and is
easy to operationalize because the Beta distribution becomes narrower the larger the val-
ues for a and b. Therefore a and b can be set to reflect the number of pseudo-observations
I have made. By this I mean that my confidence in the prior, determined by the values
of a and b, is as if I had made actual observations. Let’s assume that a quick revision of
Norwegian political history reveals that no government has ever lost as much as 24% of
its voters between two elections, I am therefore fairly confident that this can’t be the case
barely two months after the election. I decide that my confidence is as if I had sampled
1 000 respondents and obtained a proportion rg = 0.478 equal to the election result. I
then set a = 478 and b = 522. With Binomial likelihood and a Beta prior it is a matter
of adding the exponents together to obtaint the posterior.
f(rg|poll) ∝ rg385(1− rg)615rg477(1− rg)521 = rg862(1− rg)1136
Which is a Beta distribution with a = 863 and b = 1137. The expectation of the Beta
distribution is E[X] = a
a+b
so the posterior estimate of the support for the Red-Green
coalition is 863/(863 + 1137) = 0.4315 or 43.2%. With the posterior distribution one can
calculate all quantities of interest, for example the probability that rg is less than or equal
to 40




rg862(1− rg)1136drg = 0.00211
which means that P (rg ≤ 0.385) is even smaller and I can conclude that it is highly
unlikely that the estimate provided by Opinion in December 2009 was particularly good.
A quantity, calculated from the posterior distribution, that there will be much talk of in
this thesis is the highest probability density region (HDR). For example a 95% HDR is the
region of values that contains 95% of the posterior probability and also has the character-
istic that the density within the region is never lower than that outside (Gelman et al.,
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2004, 38). 4 Below I obtain the HDRs by finding the relevant percentiles of the posterior
distribution, and often an HDR will be equivalent to the classical confidence interval (CI),
and I use the two names interchangeably even though I never obtain the HDRs (or CIs)
analytically in this thesis.
Bayes Theorem, as I have discussed it so far, is an undisputed mathematical fact of
probability theory. Where Bayesian statistics differs from classical frequentist statistics
is in allowing the prior probability distribution f(θ) in Equation 3.3.1 to be subjectively
specified, as I did in the polling example above. But it is exactly by allowing for subjective
priors that the Bayesian approach lends itself naturally to the problem that this thesis
aims to tackle, that of locating the level of a latent variable. Since political polls are noisy
and can potentially be plagued by bias one needs a way of weighting the information
conveyed by the polls. In the context of using political polls to determine the level of
support for a given party, the specification of subjectice priors economize the use of data.
We know a whole lot about Norwegian politics, and this knowledge should not be wasted
when observing polls. In fact, very few people with an interest for politics forget what
they know about a political party or a political system when they observe a poll result. A
poll result is always interpreted as more or less likely to be a good estimate, given other
things we know. Commentators might say that a given poll result indicates that a party
is struggling, but probably not as much as the poll result suggests, and so on. Bayes
Theorem is the formula for how one should combine these two pieces of information to
new (posterior) beliefs about the state of the world. In the polling example above Bayes
Theorem was used to determine the level of support for the Red-Green coalition. Until
observing the poll published by Opinion I believed that the coalition was enjoying the
support of 47.8% of the electorate. After having observed the poll which gave the coalition
38.5% of the vote intentions, my updated belief was that 43.2% of the electorate supported
the coalition. In the next chapter I introduce the Dynamic Linear Model, which is an
extension of the type of model used in this example to the case where party support is
not static, but evolving over time.
4More precisely, an 100(1−α)% HDR for a parameter θ is a region A in the probability space for the
parameters where P (θ ∈ A) = 1− α and P (θ1) ≥ P (θ2) for all θ1 ∈ A and θ2 /∈ A (Jackman, 2009, 26)
4The Dynamic Linear Model
In this chapter I introduce the two Dynamic Linear Models (DLMs) I use to track the
distribution of support among the Norwegian political parties. In a first part the model
most commonly used for this purpose in presidential and two-bloc/party systems, the
Gamma-Normal model, is presented, and I show why this model is problematic to use
in the case of a multiparty system such as the Norwegian. Therefore, in a second part I
develop a model that is theoretically sound when tracking party support in a multiparty
system. This is the Dirichlet-Multinomial model. I use the two models to estimate party
support for the three previous parliamentary periods, as well as the current. The results
are displayed graphically and the two models are compared. Lastly, I present the esti-
mated house effects and discuss their potential use in forecasting of election outcomes.
For the sake of forecasting, the DLMs provide me with a estimates that can be used to
determine the effects of political events and economic conditions on party support, as well
as a clear description of how the support for individual parties is evolving over time. All
this is valuable information when trying to predict the future course of party support,
and ultimately the outcome of elections.
Dynamic Linear Models (DLMs) are Bayesian models well suited for modelling the dy-
namics of a latent quantity for which there only are imprecise measurements. As discussed
in Section 1.1, support for political parties is such a quantity. The actual distribution
of support is only observable on election day, while in between elections political polls
provide us with imprecise measurements of what the distribution and level of support
might be. This is a setting that lends itself naturally to modelling with a DLM. In effect,
a DLM tackles the three problems elaborated on in Section 3.1 on the problems with
political polls (Jackman, 2005, 508). First, with a DLM I will be able to use all the
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polling data I have available, and thereby take advantage of all the information there is
and increase the precision of my estimates. In other words, the DLM provides a solution
to the potential problems caused by pooling the polls. Second, the DLM, as I formulate
it below, makes estimation of the house effects possible. Given that these estimates tell
a convincing story, I can adjust for these in subsequent analysis and when updating an
election forecast. The third point is of more general interest, and is not that important
for this thesis. Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that the DLM produces estimates of
the support for each party at each point in time (weeks and months in my analysis) so
that questions concerning the effect of a given event can be meaningfully answered. In
addition, the DLM produces an estimate of the variance of the latent state. Generally,
DLMs are methods for modelling of a time series {yt} = y1, y2, ..., yt that may be a scalar
or a vector quantity. In the Gamma-Normal model I present below, the time series is a
scalar quantity. This means that the time series takes the form
0.32, 0.29, 0.28, . . .
In the Dirichlet-Multinomial model I develop for multiparty systems I will work with a
time series that is a series of vector observations. A time series of vector observations




















 · · ·
A DLM consists of three components (West and Harrison, 1997, 102). First, an observa-
tion equation describing how the observed time series {yt} is generated by an unobserved
times series {αt} of latent states. Second, a transition equation describing how this latent
state evolves over time. And third, the initial information (the prior as discussed in Sec-
tion 3.3) through which I specify my prior knowledge about {αt}. In the two sections that
follow I introduce two DLMs that are based on different distributional assumptions. The
first is the Gamma-Normal DLM. This model is the most conventional DLM and the one
used by Jackman (2005) and Beck et al. (2006) in their papers tracking support for the
two political blocs in Australia, and for president Bush in the US. As will become clear,
applying the Gamma-Normal model to a multiparty system is theoretically problematic,
as one breaks many of the assumptions that underpins this model in so doing. Therefore,
1The proportions of the scalar time series and the elements in the vectors are meant to represent the
data I will be working with in the two models. A scalar observation might as well be an integer, and the
elements of a vector real numbers.
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in Section 4.2 I will develop and fit a Dirichlet-Multinomial model to the same data. This
model is theoretically sound when modelling party support in multiparty systems.
4.1 The Gamma-Normal model
When using a Gamma-Normal model and polling data to track the support for individual
political parties in a multiparty system such as the Norwegian I must make some rather
strong assumptions. First, I must regard the data generating process as n independent
Bernoulli trials. This means that I regard the questioning of a survey respondent as an
experiment with two possible outcomes: the survey respondent either has the intention
to vote for a given party or not. Consequently the observed yt will follow a Binomial
distribution. This is a strong assumption, because the response of one survey respondent
obviously does not have to fall into one of two categories, but rather one of as many
categories as there are political parties (plus a category for others and those who have
no intention to vote). Second, a consequence of regarding the data generating process as
independent Bernoulli trials is that I am not dealing with one time series {αt}, but several
independent time series’. This is also problematic because a party’s share of support is not
independent of the share of support enjoyed by another party, but in the Gamma-Normal
framework they are modelled as if they were. This means that the model can generate
absurd results, such as the sum of support for all the parties exceeding one.
Nevertheless, the advantages of these assumptions comes from the fact that, under
some conditions, the Binomial distribution can be well approximated by the Normal dis-
tribution (Devore and Berk, 2007, 184).2 Thus, these assumptions allow me to work with
a Normal distribution that is intuitive and easy to interpret, where specification of mod-
els that include house effects is straightforward. Furthermore, under these assumptions
I can use a transition equation that is intuitive and produces a posterior at t that is di-
rectly applicable as a prior at t+ 1. Most importantly, the Gamma-Normal model is the
workhorse model for the problem at hand, applications using the Dirichlet-Multinomial
model to track party support in multiparty systems are rare or non-existent (I have not






px(1 − p)n−x, and E[X] = np, Var(X) = np(1 − p). When, as here, one wants to make
inferences about a population proportion p, the sample number of successes is divided by the sample
size, X/n, and E[X/n] = p, Var(X/n) = p(1 − p)/n. For the normal approximation to the binomial to
be tenable, one must have np ≥ 10 and n(1 − p) ≥ 10, if this is not the case the Binomial distribution
will be too skewed for the symmetric normal curve (Devore and Berk, 2007, 185-186). Translated to the
problem at hand, the requirements of np ≥ 10 and n(1 − p) ≥ 10 means that the number x of survey
respondents who said the would vote for a given party cannot be too small, and that the sample size n
of the survey cannot be too small either.
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found any). These advantages will become clearer as I go along.
Under these assumptions the observed data (the polls) are regarded as generated by
a Normal process. Let i = 1, ..., n index the polls published on a given point in time
t = 1, ..., T , and let nti be the sample size of poll i at time t. Then yti ∈ [0, 1] is the
observed poll result. The observational model is then
yti = µti + νti, νti ∼ N [0, σ2ti] (4.1.1)
Where the observational error variance is σ2ti is estimated from the data and is due to the





The expectation µti is modeled as a linear combination of the actual but unobservable
support for a given party αt (the latent state), and an effect δj specific to each particular
polling institute j = 1, ..., J
µti = αt + δj (4.1.3)
Ultimately, it is the latent state αt I want to make inferences about. The transition model
I use is a random walk (West and Harrison, 1997, 53), this means that I assume that on
average the level of support for a given party is equal to yesterday’s level of support for
the party (Jackman, 2009, 479). This yields the following transition equation
αt = αt−1 + t t ∼ N [0, ω2] (4.1.4)
When the model is estimated the sampling algortihm (briefly described in Appendix B.3)
runs through the time series as many times as I specify. For each iteration the random
walk is intialized by a value sampled from a uniform distribution. In other words, the
time series of the latent state starts at a different place for each iteration
α1 ∼ Unif(l, u)
where l and u are party specific points set to bracket the range of plausible election results
for the party in question. When it comes to the variance ω2 I follow what is common in the
Bayesian literature (West and Harrison, 1997, 53) and work with the precision φ = 1/ω2
instead of the variance directly. The precison φ is unknown and I ascribe it a Gamma
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prior density,
f(φ) = Gamma[a, b] (4.1.5)
where a and b are the shape and rate parameters (1/b is the scale parameter). In Ap-
pendix B I provide a more thorough description of the Gamma-Normal model. I discuss
the specification of the priors, derive the conditional posterior distributions and show how
the model is implemented in JAGS, a software for Bayesian analysis. In the next section
I present the Dirichlet-Multinomial model, before I go ahead and discuss the data and
the results of the two models in Section 4.3.
4.2 The Dirichlet-Multinomial model
As I showed above in Section 4.1 the use of a Gamma-Normal normal model in the case of
a multiparty system rests on some rather strong assumptions. It was primarily three issues
that make it problematic to use a model where the underlying assumption is that the data
generating process is a binomial process. First, when a survey respondent in a multiparty
system is asked about his or her vote intentions it is clearly wrong to regard this as a
Bernoulli experiment. Remember that a Bernoulli experiment is what you perform when
you flip a coin, and that a coin has two sides. Questioning of a survey respondent in a
political system such as the Norwegian, on the other hand, is more like rolling a biased
dice. This means that since each survey respondent can fall into as many categories as
there are political parties (plus a category for those who can’t answer and for those who
have no intention to vote) it is more correct to regard the data as being generated by a
multinomial process. Second, since the Binomial distribution is not well approximated
by the Normal distribution when support for a party is close to its limiting values of
0 (or 1), the approximation might not fit that well for smaller parties in the analysis
(Devore and Berk, 2007, 186). Since there exist parties relevant for the analysis (they
might be represented in parliament) that enjoy very little support among the electorate,
this is a problem that one has to face when doing this kind of analysis in all multiparty
systems. And finally, when modelling support for the parties in a multiparty system one
needs a model that is restricted to providing estimates whose sum is always equal to one.
The model I now present tackles all these problems, but as I will show, it is not as fit for
modelling a quantity that evolves over time as the model above.
I view the questioning of each of the nti participants in a given survey as a multinomial
experiment with k = 1, . . . , 8 possible outcomes. Either, the respondent intends to vote
for one of the seven parties currently represented in parliament, if this is not the case, the
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respondent is put in an eighth category. Consequently, this eighth category consists of
those who intend to vote for an eighth party, are not able to answer, or have no intention
to vote. Furtermore, I assume that the probability of each of the outcomes is constant
across the nti survey respondents. This means that the probability of interviewing a survey
respondent that intends to vote for Venstre is equal across all the interviews (Lid Hjort,
2012, 15). Summing up the number of respondents in each category one obtains a count
vector yt = (yt,1, . . . , yt,8) where the elements are the number of respondents in each
category. With the data I have at hand these count vectors are obtained by multiplying
the percentage share in each of the eight categories by the sample size of the poll, and then
rounding off to the nearest integer. Furtermore, since I estimate the models on a weekly or
a monthly basis, the count vectors appearing in the same week/month are simply added
together. This results in an observed time series y1, . . . ,yT of vector quantities. The
observational model is then
(yt1, . . . , yt8) ∼ Multi(nt, αt1, . . . , αt8) (4.2.1)
where the probability mass function of the Multinomial distribution is given by
p(yt1, . . . , yt8) =
nt!
yt8! · · · yt8!α
yt1
t1 · · ·αyt8t8 (4.2.2)
In fact, since the variance of the Multinomial distribution is a function of αtk and nt
Equation 4.2.1 fully specifies the observational model. As in the previous model, it is
the parameters αtk giving the latent state of support for the seven parties (plus one)
I want to make inferences about. In order to fully specify a Bayesian model I need a
prior over these. The conjugate prior distribution for the Multinomial is a multivariate
generalization of the Beta distribution (encountered in Section 3.3) known as the Dirichlet
distribution (Gelman et al., 2004, 83).3 A Dirichlet prior over (αt1, . . . , αt8) ensures that
the αtk parameters sum to one as wanted. The probability density function of the Dirichlet
distribution is given by
pi(αt1, . . . , αt8) =
Γ(bt1 + · · ·+ bt8)
Γ(bt1) · · ·Γ(bt8) α
bt1−1
t1 · · ·αbt8−1t8 (4.2.3)
3A prior is conjugate for a likeliood if the posterior distribution belongs to the same class of distri-
butions as the prior (Hoff, 2009, 49). Often this means that the prior and the posterior are the same
distributions. In the Beta-binomial model in the example in Section 3.3 the prior and the posterior
were both Beta distributions. In the Dirichlet-Multinomial model the prior and the posterior are both
Dirichlet.
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By Bayes Theorem this gives a posterior distribution for the αtk’s that is also Dirichlet
with parameters btk + ytk. Which, as in the Beta-binomial model, is simply the sum of
the exponents
pi(αt1, . . . , αt8|yt1, . . . , yt8) ∼ Diri(bt1 + yt1, . . . , bt8 + yt8) (4.2.4)
For each iteration the parameters of the Dirichlet prior are drawn from a uniform distri-
bution
btk ∼ Unif(l, u) (4.2.5)
where l and u are set to bracket the range of plausible election results for party k =
1, . . . , 8. To implement this model as a DLM is a little more challenging because the
model does not lend itself as easily to a dynamic setting as the Gamma-Normal model.
The challenge consists of deciding how to deal with the fact that the samples from the
Dirichlet posterior are proportions αtk ∈ [0, 1] while the parameters used to specify the
Dirichlet prior, the btk’s, are integers. How I deal with this issue and how the Dirichlet-
Multinomial model is implemented as a DLM is shown in Appendix C together with the
Python program I have written to run the model.
4.3 Real-time tracking of party support
The DLM of ultimate interest in this thesis is the model that tracks the evolution of
party support from the election of 2009 until present on a weekly basis. As new polls are
published, the model is continuously updated. Before I go on to discuss the results of this
model, I will take a closer look at the Gamma-Normal and Dirichlet-Multinomial models
estimated for the three parliamentary periods of 1997-2001, 2001-2005 and 2005-2009,
and presented in a series of graphs in Figures A.1, A.2 and A.3 in Appendix A. The
data used to estimate the Gamma-Normal and the Dirichlet-Multinomial models for the
three previous parliamentary periods are polling data collected by Professor Aardal.4 For
the periods 2001-2005 and 2005-2009 I have data from five polling institutes and from
four institutes for the 1997-2001 period.5 Compared to the data I have for the period
from 2009 to the present, there are two weaknesses with these polling data: the data are
averaged for each of the polling institutes on a monthly basis, and no sample sizes are
reported. To deal with the latter I have simply imputed the average sample sizes for the
4The data was kindly provided to me by Aardal via my supervisor.
5These are Synovate, Gallup, Opinion, Nielsen and Sentio. Minus Sentio for the oldest parliamentary
period.
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five institutes for the period from 2009 to the present. Since the number of polls con-
ducted by a institute a given month is unknown to me, I have, as a conservative measure,
imputed the sample size of one poll only. This measure assures that the sample sizes are
unlikely to be exaggerated. Due to the fact that the data are monthly averages, the actual
fields dates (the days during which the interviewing took place) are unknown. Since a
monthly average is necessarily calculated at the end of each month, I have experimented
with model specifications where I date the polls to the last day of each month, and es-
timate the models on a weekly basis. This means that the model is only fed data on
every fourth point in time. Such sparse data availability does not need to be a problem,
as a DLM is well suited to handling missing data points since inference for αt can pro-
ceed with the transition model serving as the posterior (Jackman, 2009, 474). For the
Gamma-Normal model this sparsity of data does, however, result in an estimated time
series {αt} that is overly noisy, and causes the confidence intervals to jump up and down.
I have therefore chosen to estimate the Gamma-Normal model on a monthly basis for the
three previous parliamentary periods, and in order to make the models comparable the
Dirichlet-Multinomial model is also estimated on a monthly basis.
To reiterate, the unknown parameters estimated in the Gamma-Normal model are for
each time series 47 αt parameters giving the monthly levels of support for the party in
question for each month between two elections (12× 4 minus the month the election took
place), the five or four house specific effects δj, and the precision parameter φ = 1/ω
2
characterizing the week-to-week volatility of αt. Inference for these parameters proceed
by using the Gibbs sampler in JAGS to sample repeatedly from the posterior densities of
the model parameters. For the Dirichlet-Multinomial model the unknown parameters are
only the 47 αt parameters, and inference for these parameters is obtained by sampling
from the posterior Dirichlet distribution for each point in time. In Appendices B and C
I provide more details on how this is done.
The results of these two models estimated for the three previous parliamentary periods
are presented in a series of graphs in Figures A.1, A.2 and A.3 in Appendix A. The graphs
show the estimated latent levels of support for the seven parties currently represented in
parliament. Each plotted point is the mean of the values sampled from the posterior den-
sity of αt. The shaded regions are the 2.5 and 97.5 percentiles of the posterior distribution
for each αt (the 95% HDRs). All the models for the previous parliamentary periods are fit
subject to the constraint that on the last day αT has to equal the actual election outcome.
Visual inspection of the graphs reveals that the most striking thing is the resemblance
of the estimated times series. For the Gamma-Normal model this is reassuring, because
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it indicates that even though some fundamental assumptions are broken when using a
Gamma-Normal model on the multiparty Norwegian system, the results are sensible. A
more formal inspection of the time series that I conducted in R shows that the sum of the
estimated means αt never exceeds one. There are, however, individual samples from the
posterior distribution that do. The resemblance of the two models does not indicate that
the Gamma-Normal model will work for all multiparty systems, neither does it mean that
it is a good model for the Norwegian system. It only means that the results seem plausible
for the Norwegian case for these three parliamentary periods. There are probably two
reasons for this. First, that none of the seven parties at no point in time during the three
parliamentary periods experienced poll results that were so close to zero that the Normal
approximation to the Binomial breaks down. Second, the relative agreement between the
polls and the fact that they all have sample sizes of about the same size, hinders the sum
of the estimated means from exceeding one when the model is estimated at a monthly
basis.
Of more substantive interest the graphs show clearly that the Norwegian party system has
been moving towards a system with three dominating parties, Ap, H and Frp, and that
Ap has become less dominating relative to the two latter. Another interesting feature of
the graphs is that the time series of H and Frp are close to being mirror images of each
other, when Frp goes up H dips down and opposite. Another pertinent feature of the
three graphs is the volatility of the estimated time series of the three big parties relative
to the four smaller parties. For Frp the volatility of the time series are particularly pro-
nounced. According to Jupsk˚as (2011) the reason for this volatility is the protest motives
of the Frp-voters and their lack of strong party identification. This visual impression
is confirmed by the estimated standard deviation
√
ω2 of the three time series for Frp,
which at 0.017, 0.017 and 0.021 are much higher than the estimated standard deviations
for the time series of the other parties (except Ap in 1997-2001 which has
√
ω2 = 0.02). In
addition, few others parties seem to experience the same sudden spikes in support as Frp.
My prime focus here will therefore be in this party. Jupsk˚as (2011) suggests that these
spikes are caused by particular events and issues that dominated the public’s attention
for a certain period of time. Chronologically, the apparent immense rise in support for
Frp in September 2000 was most probably caused by a prolonged media focus on gaso-
line duties and taxes in general, Norway was marked by what could resemble an anti-tax
protest movement (Jupsk˚as, 2011). In the months leading up to the election of 2001 it
was, however, the other party of the right, Høyre (H) that managed to take advantage
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of the discontent when Frp became plagued by internal antagonism that weakened the
party. In Figure A.3 we see that the prime loser of the general discontent was Ap, whose
veritable downturn coincides with the start of the media focus on gas prices and taxes.
The sudden spike in support for Frp around october 2002, visible in Figure A.2 was most
probably the product of an unpopular budget and the attention that asylum seekers were
given in the media. In March and April 2006 the publication of caricatures of the Profet
Muhammed marked the political debate and received a lot of attention in the media. Fig-
ure A.1 indicates that this worked to the benefit of Frp. The sudden dip in the support
for Frp in October 2007 is often explained as a consequence of that climate change had
been put to the forefront of the public’s attention, with Al Gore receiving the Nobel Peace
Prize for his efforts against climate change the same year. Frp is not known for being a
climate friendly party. In August 2008 many cultural personalitites, often associated with
an urban leftist elite residing in Oslo, went toghether in a public attack on the culture
policy of Frp. This attack lead many voters to rally around Frp (Jupsk˚as, 2011). Another
feature that is particularly visible in Figure A.3 and A.1 is the spikes in support for H and
the dips in support for Frp in the middle of the parliamentary period. This is the period
when the local elections take place, and the spikes and dips of H and Frp are often seen
as a consequence of many right leaning voters opting for H in the local elections (Jupsk˚as,
2011). In the time series plots in Figure A.1, A.2 and A.3 I have indicated the events
mentioned in this short discussion.
In Figure 4.1 I graph the Gamma-Normal and Dirichlet-Multinomial models for the cur-
rent parliamentary period. The first poll in this period dates from November 5. 2009,
while the most recent poll was published on May 11. 2013. This makes for a total of
406 polls. Without exception the data used to update the model are drawn from the site
pollofpolls.no. On this site, which was created in 2009, one can find all the politi-
cal polls published in Norway, including meta data such as sample sizes, field dates and
method of interviewing. There are eight polling institutes that conduct national polls.
These are Gallup, InFact, Ipsos, Norfakta, Norstat, Opinion, Respons and Sentio. I esti-
mate both the Gamma-Normal and the Dirichlet-Multinomial model on a weekly basis,
where a poll is labeled as having been conducted in the middle of its field period, i.e. if
the interviewing for a poll took place from May 2. to May 8. 2013, I date the poll to May
5., which is week 190 in the period.
To get a sense of where the DLM estimates are relative to the individual polls I have
overlayed the point estimates of the respective polling houses for Ap and Frp. From these
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time series plots the house effects are clearly visible. For example, we see that when it
comes to Fremskrittspartiet (Frp) the point estimates of the polling house Sentio con-
sistently lies above the estimated line, and at many points in time far outside the 95%
highest density region of the posterior density. The polling house Respons, on the other
hand, seems to underestimate Frp. These results are more formally presented in Fig-
ure 4.2 in Appendix A, where the exact estimates of the house effects are plotted for each
of the parties with the corresponding confidence intervals.
When it comes to the point estimates of the Gamma-Normal and the Dirichlet-
Multinomial models they are less alike in Figure 4.1 than in the graphs for the three
preceeding parliamentary periods. The reason for this is the higher frequency of polling
data, and that differences in the specification of the priors between the two models make
them react differently to new observations. The Dirichlet-Multinomial model is less sensi-
ble to rapid swings in the estimates provided by the polling houses, that is, the Dirichlet-
Multinomial model produces a smoother time-series than the Gamma-Normal. The clear-
est example of this is how the estimated time series react to the polls published in the
wake of the terrorist attacks of July 2011, a period during which Ap experienced some poll
results far above what the party had seen prior to the attacks. Some of the polls showed
support for Ap above 40 percent.6 It is clear that the Gamma-Normal model is much
more sensitive to these poll results than the Dirichlet-Multinomial model. The priors of
the two models are different in the sense that in the Dirichlet-Multinomial model my con-
fidence in the prior is less a function of yesterday than in the Gamma-Normal model, this
means that if the Gamma-Normal model traverses a period with no or little polling, it be-
comes very sensitive to the appereance of polls. And normally, July is a month with very
little polling. In the Dirichlet-Multinomial model, on the other hand, the prior weights
more heavy and is not as prone to being dominated by the likelihood, even though it has
not been fed data for a period of time. Obviously, we have little reason to believe that
support for the political parties fluctuates with the frequency that the Gamma-Normal
model suggests, which means that the smoother time series of the Dirichlet-Multinomial
model seems more plausible. In addition, it is as I have shown, the theoretically correct
model. For the forecast functions that I develop in the next chapter I will therefore use
the estimates provided by the Dirichlet-Multinomial DLM.
6Ipsos 31. July, 41.7%; Gallup 1. August, 40.5%; and Norfakta 6. August, 40.4%



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 4.1: Weekly tracking of party support. Shaded areas are 95% HDRs. Individual polls
are represented with plotted point at their respective point estimates for Ap and Frp.
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4.4 Estimated house effects
In Figures 4.2, A.4, A.5 and A.6 the point estimates and confidence intervals for the
house effects are plotted for the present and the three preceeding parliamentary periods.
It is important to note that the selection of polling houses is not the same in the model
for the current period as in the three preceeding. For the sake of comparison, I will
start by discussing the parliamentary periods of 1997-2001, 2001-2005 and 2005-2009.
The question of substantive interest here is whether the bias (or lack thereof) of a given
polling house points in the same direction and has about the same magnitude for all three
periods (in addition to having HDRs that don’t overlap zero).
Visual inspection of the figures reveals that there are only a few polling houses for
which the answer to this question is unequivocally affirmative. The polling house Opinion
consistently underestimates the support for Arbeiderpartiet (Ap). The magnitude of
this negative bias ranges from 0.4 percentage points in the 2001-2005 period to almost
2 percentage points in the 2005-2009 parliamentary period. Furthermore, we see that
Gallup’s estimates for Kristelig folkeparti (Krf) consistently lies about half a percentage
point below the estimated line for the three last periods, while it is still negative but
cannot be distinguished from zero in the current period. For the other parties and polling
houses the biases are more variable, for some periods pointing in a negative direction,
and in a positive direction for other periods, with point estimates that are distinguishable
from zero in one period, but not in the others, and so on. An interesting pattern should,
however, be commented upon. That is the variability of biases when it comes to the
polling houses’ estimates for Fremskrittspartiet (Frp) and Høyre (H). Even though it is
hard to discern a pattern (because there aren’t any) as to which houses are biased in
which direction, my estimates of the house effects could indicate that the polling houses
are having a hard time finding their preferred weighting procedure when it comes to these
two parties. An example of a polling house that my estimates indicate as being more
often on the mark than not, is Nielsen. The estimates for Nielsen are not distinguishable
from zero for any of the parties during the 2001-2005 period. During the period that
followed Nielsen did, however, perform poorly in estimating Frp and H, but so did most
other houses as well. One thing is clear from these figures, that is that the polling houses
are more often off in their estimates for the three big parties Ap, Frp and H, than for the
four smaller parties. The estimated house effects for the present parliamentary period are
shown in the Figure 4.2, while the remaining three Figures are found in Appendix A.
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Figure 4.2: House effects 2009-present. The effects are constrained to sum to zero.
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4.5 Summary
In this chapter I have presented the two DLMs and compared the estimates that these
two models produce for four parliamentary periods. I have explained why the Dirichlet-
Multinomial DLM is theoretically more sound, and shown how it produces a smoother
and more plausible time series. The results of the DLMs are interesting in their own
right because they can be used to answer questions of substantive interest in political
science. Particularly, with the Dirichlet-Multinomial DLM I have shown how one can
track party support in multiparty systems. In the next chapter I look at the problem of
forecasting the outcome of elections. Forecasting elections is in many ways extrapolating
the time series of the DLMs into the future, and therefore the development of the time
series up until today provides essential information for forecasting their future path. I
develop two models for forecasting elections that incorporate the output of the Dirichlet-
Multinomial DLM in two different ways, and I use the benefit of hindsight to evaluate
their performance.
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5Forecasting the distribution of seats
This chapter proceeds in three steps leading up to the forecasts for the election of 2013.
First, since I am forecasting elections in a multiparty system where it is ultimately the
number of seats in parliament that counts, I provide an introduction to the Norwegian
electoral system in Section 5.1. Second, in Section 5.2 I present my strategy for translating
the national vote shares of the parties to the actual distribution of seats in parliament.
Third, the methods I develop for predicting elections are presented in Section 5.3 and
their performance is evaluated in Section 5.4. Finally, in Section 5.5 I present my forecast
for the election of 2013.
5.1 The electoral system
Below I develop two methods for predicting the outcome of elections in multiparty sys-
tems. What these two methods have in common is that they provide estimates of the
national vote shares of each of the seven parties currently in parliament (plus an eighth
category). This is because they are based on estimates from the DLMs, and these esti-
mates are, as we saw, produced by national level polling data. The number of seats a
party obtains in parliament is only partly based on the national vote share of the party,
I must therefore find a way of translating the national level forecasts to actual seats in
parliament. Before I consider how to develop such a method, I explain how the Norwegian
electoral system works.
The Norwegian electoral system is a proportional system at the level of the counties,
where each of the counties are represented according to a weighting scheme involving the
number of inhabitants and the size (square meters) of the county. Norway consists of 19
counties, and these 19 counties are also the electoral districts. The parliament (Stortinget)
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H A Frp Sv Sp Krf
Votes 81 140 80 862 39 851 26 295 12 187 11 229
1.4 57 957 (1) 57 758 (2) 28 465 (3) 18 782 (6) 8 705 8 020
3 27 046 (4) 26 954 (5) 13 283 (9) 8 765 4 062 3 743
5 16 228 (7) 16 172 (8) 7 970
7 11 591 (10) 11 551 (11)
9 9 015 8 984
Total seats 4 4 2 1 0 0
Table 5.1: Example of modified version of Sainte-Lague¨s method
consists of 169 members of parliament, of whom 150 are distributed at the level of the
county, while the remaining 19 are so called equalization mandates (In Norwegian: utjevn-
ingsmandater), where each county has one equalization mandate. The delegation of seats
in parliament proceeds as follows. First, a modified version of Sainte-Lague¨s method is
used in each of the 19 counties. This method consists for calculating successive quotients
v
2s+ 1
where v is the total number of votes received by a party from the county, and s is the
number of seats delegated to the party so far in the process. The modified version used
in Norway consists of setting the first denominator to 1.4 thereby giving an advantage to
bigger parties. Table 5.1 shows a hypothetical example with eleven seats being delegated
We see that Høyre received 81 140 votes in this county, and that their first quotient is
the largest. The ranking of the quotients is shown in parentheses. The second largest
quotient belongs to Ap who gets the second mandate, and so on until the eleven mandates
are distributed. When this first part of the process is done, 150 mandates have been
distributed. The second step is then the calculation of the equalization mandates. Only
the parties who have received 4% or more of the national votes compete for these. The
modified version of Sainte-Lague¨s method is used, but this time considering the entire
nation as one electoral district. In this second stage the number of mandates distributed
equals 169 minus the mandates obtained from the counties by the parties below the
4% threshold. Each party is accorded as many equalization mandates as the difference
between what they would have obtained considering the nation as one electoral district
and what they have obtained from the counties. If one finds that some of the differences
are negative, i.e. that a party has obtained more mandates from the provinces than it
would have obtained nationally, all the county-mandates of the party or parties in question
are subtracted from the initial mandates (the 169 minus the mandates won by the parties
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below 4%), and Sainte-Lague¨s method is applied once over with the remaining mandates
and the parties with positive differences in the first iteration of Saint-Lague¨s method.
This process continues until all the differences are positive, and these positive differences
are the number of equalization mandates the parties get.1 The third step consists of
deciding from which counties the parties get their equlization mandates. To decide this
one ranks the following quotients
votes
(mandates× 2 + 1)avg.votes
where the nominator is the number of votes the party has received in the given county,
while in the denominator one finds the number of mandates that the party has obtained
in the county and the average number of votes that is behind each mandate in the county.
Finally, the first equalization mandate is delegated to the party and the county with the
largest quotient, the second to the party and county with the second largest quotient and
so on. One stops considering the quotients of a party when the party has been delegated
the number of equalization mandates that it is due.
5.2 From votes to seats
For each of the three forecast functions developed below I employ the same strategy for
mapping votes to seats. I simply use Saint-Lague¨s method. But in order to do this I
need an estimate of the actual number of votes that each party receives in each of the 19
counties. My approach is based on studying the county-wise deviance from the national
share of votes for each party in the 2009 election. I assume that this deviance changes
very slowly over time, so that the national vote share of a party is a good predictor of
its share of the votes in a given county. For example, in 2009 Sosialistisk Venstreparti
(Sv) obtained 6.2% of the votes nationally and 5.7% percent of the votes in the county of
Akershus. The deviance, as I calculate it here, is then 5.7/6.2 = 0.92. With a forecast for
Sv at 6.4% nationally I predict that Sv receives 6.4 × 0.92 = 5.9 percent of the votes in
Akershus. Furthermore, in 2009 there were 375 622 people eligible to vote in Akershus,
of whom 302 021 turned out on election day. I assume that the turnout will be about the
same in 2013 in each of the counties. The forecast is then that 0.059× 375 622 = 22 162
voters cast their ballots for Sv in Akershus.2 This procedure is applied to all the counties
1I thank Professor Aanund Hylland for clearing up this point.
2This last part superfluous as it does not change the ordering of the quotients to multiply them by
the turnout. Nevertheless, it only costs me one line of coding and it is nice to look at something close to
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and all the parties. With these figures I can proceed algorithmically with Sainte-Lague¨s
method to obtain the predicted distribution of seats in parliament and the number of
equalization mandates obtained by each party. Sainte-Lague¨s method is a deterministic
method, so the uncertainty associated with the number of seats obtained by a given party
results from providing Sainte-Lague¨s method with several samples from the distributions
produced by the forecast functions. In Appendix F I have attached the Python-program
that applies Sainte-Lague¨s method to calculate the distribution of seats in parliament.
5.3 The forecast functions
Even though they are often spoken of as equivalent, a poll is not the same as a fore-
cast (Lock and Gelman, 2010, 347). Neither are the estimates produced by the DLMs
forecasts, they are real-time tracking of party support. The utility of the estimates from
the DLMs are that they provide precise and (almost) continuous estimates of the level of
support for the different political parties, which can be crucial information when making
a forecast. In this section I develop two different forecast functions and use the benefit of
hindsight to test the performance of these functions on past elections. Since it is in May
that I will make my first forecast for the election of 2013, all of the ex post forecasts are
conducted in May 2001, 2005 and 2009. The first function I develop is based solely on
the output from the DLM, while the second combines the output from the DLM with the
estimated effects of political and economic variables that affect the parties differently.
The most common way of forecasting election results is by extrapolating the distribu-
tion of support among the political parties today and into the future (see Hanretty (2013)
for a recent example from Italy). For example, if my estimate for Sp today is at seven
percent, my forecast is that Sp will receive seven percent of the votes on election day.
This is not necessarily a bad strategy, and intutively it should be a better strategy the
closer one is to election day. I use this linear forecast as the benchmark for my two other
forecast functions. If they are any good they should be able to outperform the simple
linear extrapolation of a time series.
The first forecast function is based purely on the output of the Dirichlet-Multinomial
DLM and is founded on a very simple idea: namely that there is an underlying trend in the
support for the parties that it is possible to capture by fitting a second order polynomial
the actual numbers instead of very small numbers.
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through the points estimated by the DLM up until the date the forecast is made.
αt = γ0 + γ1t+ γ3t
2 (5.3.1)
Considering the time series plots in Appendix A we see that many of the time series start
trending downward or upward several months prior to election day, and that this trend
often continuous until the election. The second order polynomial in Equation 5.3.1 is fit
through the estimated points from the beginning of the parliamentary period until the
day the forecast is made, and the coefficients γ0, γ1 and γ2 are in turn used to extrapolate
αt forward to election day. A problem with this approach is that I am not guaranteed
that the eight αt’s sum to one, as they must. But since they are all generated by the
points of a Dirichlet distribution, I assume that they individually are Beta distributed, as
the Beta distribution is the marginal density of the Dirichlet (Albert and Denis, 2012).
With the estimates of the eight αT ’s at hand, I view these as the means of eight Beta
distributed variables and draw 10 000 samples from the eight Beta distributions. Finally, I
divide each draw by the sum of the eight Beta distribution. The resulting vector of means
then follows the Dirichlet distribution (Albert and Denis, 2012). In Figure 5.1 below and
Figure A.7 and A.8 in Appendix A, the forecast distributions produced by extrapolating
the quadratic function four months ahead in time are presented, with the vertical lines
indicating the actual election outcome. Below I evalute the performance of this function
and compare it to the performance of the second method of forecasting that I describe
next.
The second forecast function I construct is inspired by the work of Linzer (2012). It
consists of two pieces: the estimated effects of political and economic variables on the
support for different parties and the latest output of the Dirichlet-Multinomial DLM. In
a first stage, I use the estimated effects of political and economic variables on the support
for the different parties to produce a prior forecast distribution for each party. Then, in
a second stage the prior forecast distributions are multiplied by the distributions of the
latest estimates of the latent level of support for each of the parties, as supplied by the
Dirichlet-Multinomial DLM. The idea is that the prior forecasts that I estimate in the
first stage give the election outcome one would expect if one considered political and eco-
nomic variables only: a ”natural” outcome given the state of the economy, plus possible
incumbency effects. However, with the output of the Dirichlet-Multinomial DLM I have
estimates of where party support is today, and I use this information to discipline the
pure economic forecast. The product of the two, the posterior, gives the final forecast.
This forecast function draws its theoretical underpinnings from the clientele hypoth-
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esis of the economic voting literature (Carlsen, 2000; Hibbs, 1977; Swank, 1993), that I
discussed in Section 2.1. According to this hypothesis we should expect varying economic
times to have different effects on political parties on opposite ends of the political spec-
trum. High unemployment rates and low economic growth makes people fear for their
jobs and flock around the parties on the left. An anecdotal example that accords well
with this hypothesis is the re-election of the Red-Green coalition in 2009. Many analysts
attributed the victory of this center-left coalition to the fear of the possible economic
consequences of the financial crises that had struck Europe one year prior to the election.
In more prosperous economic times, on the other hand, the hypothesis postulates that
the parties of the right should gain support. In his study of the US, Canada, the UK
and Australia Carlsen (2000) finds evidence that supports this hypothesis, namely that
higher levels of unemployment hurts the parties of the right. The findings of Arnesen in
the study discussed in Section 2.1 (where he divides the Norwegian political parties into
two blocs) also point in the same direction (2012b, 13). By a regression analysis of the
national and local elections in Norway, with political and economic independent variables
Arnesen identifies a pattern consistent with the clientele hypothesis: ”when unemploy-
ment goes up, so does the popularity of the left. Conversly, when the economy prospers,
the voters tend to support non-left parties to a higher degree than when growth is slower”
(2012b, 13).
Most of the studies investigating this hypothesis has been conducted on presidential or
two-bloc/party political systems. This means that the dependent variable either has been
a proportion far from its limiting values of 0 and 1, in which case a normal model works
fine, or dichotomous indicator (i.e. left = 0, right = 1), in which case a generalized linear
model with a logit link is a common option. Since I am working with a multiparty system
I want to have estimates of the effects of political and economic variables for all seven
political parties that I am considering, I therefore use a model for multinomial responses
with a logistic link, a Multinomial logit regression model. To estimate these effects I use
as my dependent variable the election results of the parliamentary elections from 1973 to
2009, which makes for 10 observations. I start in 1973 because this is the first election
where all the seven parties currently represented in parliament ran for election. Instead
of using the proportions of the votes obtained by each party in these elections, I take the
proportions and multiply them by an arbitrary high number to obtain a count vector that
follows the multinomial distribution.
yt ∼ Multi(nt, αt1, αt2, . . . , αt8) (5.3.2)
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where the αtk’s represents the probability of each of the k = 1, . . . , 8 categories for the
t = 1, . . . , 10 observations. I follow Gelman et al. (2004) and parametrize the model in
terms of the logarithm of the ratio of the probability of each category relative to a baseline
category. The categories are the seven parties plus an eighth category, where I have set






= ηtk = (Xβk)t (5.3.3)

















where β1 is constrained to zero. This is the Multinomial logit model that allows me to
estimate the effects of structural variables on each of the seven parties. For a complete
Bayesian specification of the model I need to set the priors over the βk’s. I ascribe normal
priors to these
βk ∼ N [bk,Σk] (5.3.5)
where the contents of bk and Σk are specified in Appendix E. Here it suffices to say
that the priors are consistent with the clientele hypothesis and the findings of Arnesen
(2012b). In accordance with the economic vote literature and the clientele hypothesis the
independent variables are annual unemployment figures measured in percentage of the
work-eligible population in the election year, GDP growth and inflation (consumer price
index growth in percent) in the election year. These are the same variables that Arnesen
(2012b) uses in his study.3 In addition I have included a dummy variable, called ”left”,
indicating whether or not Ap is in government. Even though this variable is not perfect,
due to Sp changing from the centre-right to the centre-left, it is meant to capture the
colour of the government and possible incumbency effects.
As discussed in Section 2.4 Linzer (2012) uses the forecasts generated by structural
(economic vote) models and updates these with the information conveyed by polls as
elections day approaches. The model I construct here is based on the same idea. To
reiterate, in a first stage I insert the current values of the independent variables in the
Multinomial logit model to obtain prior forecasts for each of the parties. The distributions
of the prior forecasts are produced by sampling repeatedly from the posterior distributions
of the coefficients of the Multinomial logit model. Then, in a second stage the forecasts
3The data is from Arnesens web-appendix (2012b), found at http://folk.uib.no/st03889/
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generated by the Multinomial logit model are updated using the output from the Dirichlet-
Multinomial DLM. This means that the Multinomial logit model generates a prior, this
prior is multiplied by the likelihood of the estimated latent levels of support today, and
the resulting posterior distribution is the final forecast. In the figures where I show the
results of this method of forecasting, all the three distributions are displayed.
5.4 Evaluating the forecast functions
In Figure 5.1, A.7 and A.8 I graph the forecast distributions of the Multinomial logit fore-
cast function and the quadratic function.4 In addition, the plots contain the prior and the
likelihood of the Multinomial logit forecast function. Since the likelihood is the output of
the Dirichlet-Multinomial DLM the day the forecast is made, the mean of the likelihood
is equivalent to a linear forecast, the benchmark type of forecast. By visual inspection
of the plots it seems that the ex post forecasts for the elections of 2009, 2005 and 2001
do not provide an unequivocal answer as to which method of forecast is to prefer. When
it comes the Multinomial logit forecast function there is one thing that is important to
consider when putting the model to the test of out-of-sample ex post forecasts: how much
weight should the prior have relative to the likelihood. It is tempting to let the weighting
be decided by what makes for the best ex post forecasts.5 But this would be to overfit
the model to each individual election and I would have no guidance as to which weights
are the best for future elections. As can be seen from the plots I have decided to give the
likelihood and the prior about equal weight, this is reflected in the density of the prior and
the likelihood having about equal spread. I will now consider how the two models perform
when making ex post forecasts in May the three last election years. In this evaluation
there are two things to consider, the first is the extent to which the point estimates for the
percentage share of the votes are on or off the mark for each party. The second, and for
the purpose of predicting the colour of the next government more important question, is
whether the model gets the distribution of seats right, and if the forecasts get the correct
majority.
The 2009 election led to the re-election of the Red-Green coalition, who obtained 86
seats in parliament. Parliament is made up of a total of 169 seats, so 85 seats are needed
to constitute a majority. Would the forecast functions have predicted the re-election of the
4By the Multinomial logit forecast function I refer to the forecast function that combines information
from the Multinomial logit regression model and the Dirichlet-Multinomial DLM.
5The weight accorded to the likelihood is decided by the sum of the parameters of the Dirichlet
distribution, while the sum of the elements of the count vector determines the relative weight of the
Multinomial prior.
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seats HDR actual seats HDR actual
Ap 49 [45,53] 64 Krf 13 [10,16] 10
Sv 21 [17,24] 11 V 6 [1,9] 2
Sp 8 [6,10] 11 H 29 [26,33] 30
Frp 35 [32,39] 41
Total 78 [73,83] 86 84 [78,88] 83
Table 5.2: Multinomial logit forecast function. Ex post seat predictions for the 2009 election.
90% HDRs in parantheses.
seats HDR actual seats HDR actual
Ap 61 [55,68] 64 Krf 9 [7,11] 10
Sv 12 [10,16] 11 V 9 [8,11] 2
Sp 7 [1,9] 11 H 23 [19,27] 30
Frp 47 [41,51] 41
Total 80 [75,87] 86 88 [81,93] 83
Table 5.3: Quadratic function. Ex post seat predictions for the 2009 election. 90% HDRs in
parantheses.
coalition four months prior to the election of 2009? The largest party of the Red-Green
coalition is Ap, and from Figure 5.1 below we see that the quadratic function taps the
upward trend of Ap that starts during the summer of 2008 to outperform a linear forecast.
At 33.6% the quadratic function is not far below the actual result of 34.5% for this party.
The Multinomial logit forecast function, on the other, underpredicts Ap with the mean of
the posterior at 26.4%. From the plot we see that this underprediction is caused by the
prior that puts Ap just above 20%. The unemployment rate of 2009 was at 2.7% a little
below the average unemployment rate of the nine election years the Multinomial logit re-
gression model is estimated on. A relatively high unemployment rate of 5.5%, would have
produced a prediction for Ap at 30%. For Sv and Krf we see that the quadratic function
does a better job than the Multinomial logit model, while for the four remaining parties
Sp, V, H and Frp the Multinomial logit model is closer. In Table 5.4 we see that the
Multinomial logit forecast function would in May 2009 not have predicted a Red-Green
re-election four months later, underpredicting the total number of seats by eight with only
2% of the samples falling above the majority mark. For the opposition parties of Krf, V,
H and Frp, on the other hand, the Multinomial logit model is at 84 just one seat off, but
has 40% of the samples above the majority mark for the opposition parties. Neither is the
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seats HDR actual seats HDR actual
Ap 57 [53,59] 61 Krf 15 [13,17] 11
Sv 24 [21,26] 15 V 1 [0,2] 10
Sp 13 [11,16] 11 H 30 [28,32] 23
Frp 28 [25,31] 38
Total 94 [90,98] 87 74 [70,77] 82
Table 5.4: Multinomial logit forecast function. Ex post seat predictions for the 2005 election.
90% HDRs in parantheses.
seats HDR actual seats HDR actual
Ap 58 [53,63] 61 Krf 15 [12,18] 11
Sv 23 [20,27] 15 V 2 [0,7] 10
Sp 10 [8,13] 11 H 35 [32,39] 23
Frp 24 [20,28] 38
Total 92 [86,97] 87 77 [71,82] 82
Table 5.5: Quadratic function. Ex post seat predictions for the 2005 election. 90% HDRs in
parantheses.
quadratic function capable of predicting the re-election of the coalition four months prior
to the election. Instead it overpredicts the total number of seats of the oppostion by six,
with 74% of the samples falling above the majority mark of 85 seats for the oppostion.
This means that the qudratic forecast function had in May 2009 ascribed a 0.74 probabil-
ity to an alternation in government (assuming that the opposition had figured things out
between them), while the Multinomial logit forecast function had ascribed a proabability
of 0.40 to the same event. The ex post predictions for the 2005 election are graphed
in Figure A.7 in Appendix A and the results for the distribution of seats in parliament
are presented in Table 5.4 and 5.5.6 Again it is not easy to discern a clear pattern as
to which function does the best job. Both forecast functions miss badly on H and Frp
due to the sudden leap of Frp right before the election, and the corresponding dip for H,
but perform decent when it comes to predicting the total number of seats that these two
parties obtained. The actual number was 61, with the quadratic and Multinomial logit
predicitons at 59 and 58 seats respectively. When it comes to the three partners of the
Red-Green coalition the quadratic function predicts that these would obtain a total of 91
6In the tables presented in the following pages, round-off errors will in some instances prevent the
predicted number of seats for the parties of the Red-Green coalition or the opposition to add up to their
predicted total.
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Ap forecast 2009
0.134 0.174 0.214 0.254 0.294 0.334 0.374
Sv forecast 2009
0.04 0.06 0.08 0.1 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.18 0.2 0.22 0.24
Sp forecast 2009
0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.1
Krf forecast 2009
0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.1 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.18
V forecast 2009
0 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.1
H forecast 2009
0.01 0.05 0.09 0.13 0.17 0.2 0.23 0.27 0.3 0.33
Frp forecast 2009
0.05 0.08 0.11 0.14 0.17 0.2 0.23 0.26 0.29 0.32 0.35
Figure 5.1: Forecasts for the 2009 election. The filled density is the posterior of the Multinomial
logit forecast model, the solid line represents the likelihood (the mean of which is equivalent to
a linear forecast) and the dashed line is the prior. The line consisting of small points is the
forecast distribution produced by the quadratic function.
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seats contra the 87 they actually did obtain. Furhermore, 93% of the samples fall above
the majority mark of 85 seats for these three parties. This means that the quadratic
function ascribed a probability of 0.93 to a Red-Green coalition victory four months prior
to the election of 2005. Considering the predictions for the individual parties produced
by the Multinomial logit forecast function, things are not much better. Sv is predicted at
five percentage points above its actual election result of 8.8%. As with the 2009 predic-
tions, H is overpredicted and Frp underpredicted compared to the actual election results
of the two parties. Nevertheless, when the predictions for the Red-Green coalition and
the opposition are compared, the performance of the Multinomial logit forecast is much
better. The two major parties of the oppostion, H and Frp, are predicted at a total of 58
seats, three short of the actual result. Because of overprediction for Sv, the Red-Green
coaliton is predicted as a sure bet four months in advance of the election of 2005, with
99% of the samples falling above the majoriy mark of 85.
The 2001 election was for Ap, with 24.3% of the votes, the worst election in the post-
war period. In Figure A.3 in Appendix A the decline of Ap is visible from the end of
the summer of 1998 and continues more or less unabrupted until election day in 2001.
The trend is only disrupted by the inauguration of the Ap cabinet about a year prior
to the election. Given such a pronounced trend it is not surprising that the quadratic
function taps this four months prior to the election, and outperform the benchmark linear
forecast, as shown in Figure A.8. The Multinomial logit forecast function performs badly
for Ap, Sv and Krf, but is right on the mark for the remaining parties. For H and Frp it
is interesting to note that the Multinomial logit forecasts outperform both the quadratic
function and a linear forecast. A reason for this could be the very noisy time series of the
two parties. In both cases it is the prior that drags the posterior for the two parties in the
right direction. This result is a an indication of the advantage associated with having a
forecast that incorporates information that is unaﬄicted by the volatility of peoples party
preferences in between elections. The 2001 election was the last election before a reform
of the electoral system that increased the number of equalization mandates to nineteen
and changed the system for distributing these. I have not programmed the old electoral
system, and therefore I do not translate the forecasts for the 2001 election to seats in
parliament.
There is no clear winner among the two forecast functions. Nevertheless, some points
are worth putting forward. First, the quadratic function seems to perform poorly with
overly volatile time series, and in these instances it is advantageous to have a forecast that
5.5. PREDICTIONS 51
is not based on pure data mining. Second, the Multinomial logit regression model does in
most instances produce prior forecasts (those based purely on the political and economic
variables) that are sensible, given the state of the economy, but sometimes they are a bit
exaggerated compared to the election results. In the next section I perform the forecasts
for the election of 2013, and two considerations drive my choice of model for this forecast.
The first is that the terrorist attacks during the summer of 2011 caused a sudden jump in
the time series of Ap, and dips in the time series of Frp and, yet to a lesser degree, for H.
These jumps and dips will disturb the quadratic function from tapping onto any possible
underlying trend in the time series. The second is simply that I find the Multinomial
logit forecast function more solid and satisfying from a theoretical point of view, and that
I see this model as one that can be further developed and applied to other multiparty
systems. In addition, the Multinomial logit forecast function is more prone to continous
updating as election day approaches. To forecast the 2013 election I will therefore use the
Multinomial logit forecast function.
5.5 Predictions
The forecasts for the election of 2013 are made with the Multinomial logit forecast func-
tion. In Figure 5.2 the forecast produced by the Multinomial logit forecast model is
presented by graphing the posterior distribution that I obtain by applying Bayes The-
orem to the output of the Dirichlet-Multinomial DLM with the prior provided by the
Multinomial logit regression model. The prior distributions are represented by the solid
lines and the likelihoods given by the DLM are graphed with the dashed lines. Finally,
the posteriors are the filled densities. Before I go ahead and present the forecast for the
election of 2013 there are some features of the plots in Figure 5.2 that it is worth com-
menting upon. Considering the plots for Ap, Sv and Sp, the three coalition partners of the
Red-Green coalition, we see that the priors (solid graphs) are to the right of the posteriors.
This means that the prior predicts these parties at a higher level than the posterior, this
latter being dragged down by the likelihood. The reason for the priors being at such a
high level for the parties of the Red-Green coalition has to do with the current economic
conditions, which are the data generating the prior forecast. The estimated coefficients
of the Multinomial logit regression model are found in Table E.1 in Appendix E. The
unemployment rate is currently at 3.4%, which is 23% higher than the average unem-
ployment rate of the last ten election years (which had an average unemployment rate of
52 5. FORECASTING THE DISTRIBUTION OF SEATS
Ap forecast 2013
0.25 0.27 0.29 0.31 0.33 0.35 0.37
Sv forecast 2013
0 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.1 0.12 0.14
Sp forecast 2013
0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.1 0.11 0.13
Krf forecast 2013
0 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.1
V forecast 2013
0 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.1
H forecast 2013
0.13 0.16 0.19 0.22 0.25 0.28 0.31 0.34 0.37 0.4
Frp forecast 2013
0.1 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.18 0.2 0.22 0.24
Figure 5.2: Forecasts for the election of 2013. National vote shares. The posterior distribution
in grey, the likelihood in dashed lines, and the prior represented by the solid line. The prior is
produced by the Multinomial logit model, and the likelihood is the output from the Dirichlet-
Multinomial DLM.
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seats HDR seats HDR
Ap 56 [52,60] Krf 16 [13,18]
Sv 14 [12,17] V 4 [1,8]
Sp 13 [10,14] H 28 [24,31]
Frp 36 [33,39]
Total 83 [79,87] 83 [78,88]
Table 5.6: Prior based on economic and political variables only. Predicted distribution of seats
in parliament after the election of 2013. 90% HDRs in parantheses.
seats HDR seats HDR
Ap 54 [48,59] Krf 7 [1,11]
Sv 6 [1,10] V 7 [2,11]
Sp 6 [1,11] H 56 [49,63]
Frp 25 [20,30]
Total 67 [60,74] 96 [88,104]
Table 5.7: Likelihood (Linear extrapolation). Predicted distribution of seats in parliament after
the 2013 election. This prediction is generated by the inferences made on polling data only. 90%
HDRs in parantheses.
2.76%).7 As discussed above, in Section 5.3, a relatively high unemployment rate is to
the benefit of the parties to the left. The figures for CPI growth and GDP growth push
the priors in the same direction. CPI growth is currently at 1.5% while GDP growth is
at 2.6%, this means that the former is almost at one quarter of the average CPI growth
in the last ten election years, and the latter at one third of the average for the last ten
election years. The relatively slow economic growth of present is also to the benefit of
the left. The exception to this rule is Frp, who even though being a party of the right,
seems to benefit from less prosperous economic times. The daily tracking of the latent
state as produced by the Dirichlet-Multinomial DLM, on the other hand, shows that the
opinion is not pointing in the direction of a Red-Green re-election, as reflected by the
dashed graphs in Figure 5.2 being to the left of the priors (and the posteriors) for all
three coalition partners. There are certainly other ways of combinig the information of
the linear prediction and the prediction generated by the Multinomial logit regression
model than the one I have chosen. One would be to combine the predicted distribution
of seats of the prior and the likelihood separately, instead of first combining the predicted
7The data used to produce the prior forecasts are from http://www.ssb.no/
nasjonalregnskap-og-konjunkturer/nokkeltall/konjunkturer-statistikk-analyser-og-prognoser/
54 5. FORECASTING THE DISTRIBUTION OF SEATS
mean HDR mean HDR
Ap 0.303 [0.288,0.318] Krf 0.068 [0.060,0.076]
Sv 0.066 [0.058,0.074] V 0.047 [0.041,0.055]
Sp 0.058 [0.051,0.066] H 0.251 [0.237,0.266]
Frp 0.163 [0.151,0.176]
Total 0.427 [0.411,0.443] 0.530 [0.513,0.546]
Table 5.8: Predicted national vote shares after the election of 2013. 95% HDRs in parantheses.
seats HDR seats HDR
Ap 56 [53,59] Krf 8 [7,10]
Sv 12 [10,13] V 7 [2,9]
Sp 11 [9,12] H 44 [41,47]
Frp 27 [25,29]
Total 79 [76,82] 87 [82,91]
Table 5.9: Predicted distribution of seats in parliament after the election of 2013. 90% HDRs
in parantheses.
percentage shares, and then translating the result to seats in parliament. Since, as I have
shown, the conversion from percentage shares to seats is not a one-to-one mapping, the
two approaches do not produce identical results. In Table 5.6 and 5.7 I show the predic-
tions for the distribution of seats in parliament generated by the likelihood (the linear
extrapolation of the current level of party support) and the prior separately. Remember
that the prior prediction is based solely on political and economic variables, so based one
these variables alone the prediction is a tie between the Red-Green coalition and the four
opposition parties, with three seats going to the category ”others” (with 90% HDR of
[0, 8]). The share of samples that fall above the majority mark for the Red-Green coali-
tion and the opposition are 31% and 40% respectively, thus giving the opposition a slight
advantage. To sum up this short discussion, if political polls are nothing but noise and
the economy is all that matters, then the election of 2013 seems like a close race. If, on the
other hand, we disregard the economy completely and look exclusively at the latest output
of the Dirichlet-Multinomial DLM, the opposition gets an overwhelming majority with 96
seats. I believe that it is in combining the information of these two models that the best
forecast is obtained, and I will now present the results of this averaging of the two models.
All the figures presented in Table 5.8 and 5.9 are based on 100 000 samples from the
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posterior distribution produced by the Multinomial logit forecast model, and then sup-
plying Saint-Lague¨s method with a subset of these samples.8 These numbers are obtained
by multiplying the two distributions I get from the Dirichlet-Multinomial DLM and the
Multinomial logit regression model. In addition to the seven parties reported in the ta-
bles the category ”others” is predicted to obtain 4.32% of the votes and 3.7 seats in
parliament with corresponding 90% HDRs at [0.036, 0.050] and [0, 7] respectively. The
Red-Green coalition is predicted to obtain 79 seats, seven seats less compared to what they
enjoy currently. Furthermore, the majority mark of 85 seats is outside the 90% highest
density region for the coalition. The opposition parties of Krf, V, H and Frp are predicted
to receive 87 seats in parliament, with 77.5% of the samples falling above the majority
mark of 85 seats. This means that the prediction as of May 21. is: with a probability of
0.775 the four opposition parties will win a majority of the seats in parliament.
8The point forecasts presented in Figure 5.2 are based on all 100 000 samples, because the Python-code
I have written to calculate Saint-Lague¨s method have yet to be optimized, I supplied it with a subset of
1 000 random samples.
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6Conclusion and plans for further
research
”Elections are predictable”. These words belong to the statistician and political scien-
tist Andrew Gelman (1997), and with the experience of successful predictions of election
outcomes from other countries, we have little reason to believe that they are not. As we
have seen, most of the countries where prediction has been successful have party systems
different from the Norwegian, they are presidential systems or systems with two parties
or two major blocs. But, looking at the electoral systems of the world, these are the sys-
tems that are particular and strange, most democratic countries are multiparty systems
(Clark et al., 2013, 587). Clearly, more modesty is demanded when attempting to predict
election outcomes in systems with many parties and changing alliances, but at the same
time the constellation and the relative size of parties in a country are slowly changing
characteristics of a political system. And when it comes to the voters, besides having
more options, which makes them seem more volatile, we have no reason to believe that
the behaviour of voters in multiparty systems are less predictable.
In this thesis I have worked with two models particularly suited for the task of track-
ing and forecasting party support in multiparty systems, and combined the information
they provide to produce forecasts for the Norwegian election of 2013. The Dirichlet-
Multinomial DLM and the Multinomial logit regression model are, from a statistical per-
spective, the theoretically sound models for the task, and I am convinced that the model
I am aiming for, the correct model so to say, is an extension of the combination of these
two models. By the combination of the two, I mean the manner in which I have combined
information from the two models to arrive at a posterior distribution for my forecasts. If
I consider the Dirichlet-Multinomial DLM and the Multinomial logit model of this thesis
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together, the former seems to me as the most solid, even though more work is demanded
to fully explore how to best apply this model in a dynamic setting. When it comes to
the latter model, I see primarily three deficiencies. First, a good model is not a cure for
a lack of data, and estimation of such a large model as the Multinomial logit demands
more observations than the ten elections I have estimated it on. An interesting question
in this regard is whether the model could be estimated with data points from several
different countries, with similar party structures. For example, are the post-materialist
left parties (such as Sv in Norway) across multiparty systems similar enough to use data
from several countries to determine the effect of incumbency, or unemployment, on the
support for these parties? Since elections are rare events, this is a question that is worth
exploring in further research. Second, massive amounts of good data are not a substitute
for solid theory. The focus of this thesis has not been on social scientific theory, but on the
development and novel applications of statistical models. Therefore, lack of solid theory
is a weakness of the analyses I conducted in Section 5.5, where the theoretical justification
for the model specification bordered at simple hand-waving. I must add that despite this
deficiency, the results produced by the Multinomial logit regression model makes sense.
In future applications more solid theoretical underpinnings of the model are essential. I
think that a promising avenue of research is in applying theory on the voting behaviour of
individuals in order to model voting as a two-stage decision process (Steenbergen et al.,
2011). In such a process the voters, in a first stage, use broad-based heuristics such as
class and partisanship to narrow down the options to a few viable parties they consider
voting for. In the second stage more aggregated variables could be used to predict the
party that the voters finally opt for. In such a model I could use a Multinomial logit
regression model with different variables for the different groups of voters delimited in the
first stage. This would be in accordance with the intuition I have that different groups of
voters are moved by varying types of issues.
Despite these objections to the prime forecast model of this thesis, the model combining
the Dirichlet-Multinomial DLM and the Multinomial logit regression model, I believe that
the forecasts it produces are the best forecasts of the Norwegian election of 2013 as of
May this year. I would put my money on them.
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Figure A.1: All parties 2005-2009. Weekly estimates. 95% HDRs. Poll results for H and Frp





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure A.2: All parties 2001-2005. Weekly estimates. 95% HDRs. Poll results for Ap and Sv
are represented with a plotted point at their respective point estimates.









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure A.3: All parties 1997-2001. Weekly estimates. 95% HDRs. Poll results for A and Frp
are represented with a plotted point at their respective point estimates.
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Figure A.4: House effects 2005-2009. Circles are estimated posterior mean, the lines connect
the 2.5 and 97.5 percentiles of the posterior distributions.
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Figure A.5: House effects 2001-2005. Circles are estimated posterior mean, the lines connect
the 2.5 and 97.5 percentiles of the posterior distributions.
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Figure A.6: House effects 1997-2001. Circles are estimated posterior mean, the lines connect
the 2.5 and 97.5 percentiles of the posterior distributions.
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Ap forecast 2005
0.24 0.26 0.28 0.3 0.32 0.34 0.36 0.38 0.4 0.42 0.44
Sv forecast 2005
0.04 0.06 0.08 0.1 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.18 0.2 0.22 0.24
Sp forecast 2005
0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.1 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.18 0.2
Krf forecast 2005
0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.1 0.12 0.14
V forecast 2005
0 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.1
H forecast 2005
0.09 0.11 0.13 0.15 0.17 0.19 0.21 0.23 0.25
Frp forecast 2005
0.02 0.05 0.08 0.11 0.14 0.17 0.2 0.23 0.26 0.29
Figure A.7: Forecasts for the 2005 election. The filled density is the posterior of the Multinomial
logit forecast model, the solid line represents the likelihood (the mean of which is equivalent to
a linear forecast) and the dashed line is the prior. The line consisting of small points is the
forecsats distribution produced by the quadratic function.
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Ap forecast 2001
0.2 0.23 0.26 0.29 0.32 0.35 0.38 0.41 0.44
Sv forecast 2001
0.04 0.06 0.08 0.1 0.11 0.13 0.15
Sp forecast 2001
0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.1 0.11 0.12
Krf forecast 2001
0.04 0.06 0.08 0.1 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.18 0.2
V forecast 2001
0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08
H forecast 2001
0.1 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.18 0.2 0.22 0.24 0.26
Frp forecast 2001
0.09 0.11 0.13 0.15 0.17 0.19 0.21 0.23
Figure A.8: Forecasts for the 2001 election. The filled density is the posterior of the Multinomial
logit forecast model, the solid line represents the likelihood (the mean of which is equivalent to
a linear forecast) and the dashed line is the prior. The line consisting of small points is the
forecsats distribution produced by the quadratic function.
72 APPENDIX A. FIGURES
Appendix B
The GN-model
In the following I give a more formal presentation of the Gamma-Normal model. I sub-
stantiate how the priors are set, show how the posterior distributions are dervied and
provide an example of how this model is implemented in JAGS (Plummer, 2011).
B.1 The model
As seen in Section 4.1 the time-series’ in the Gamma-Normal model were considered
independent. Therefore is suffices to consider the time series of one individual party,
since they are all derived in the same manner. Let αt be the intended vote share for one
of the parties at time t, and let i = 1, . . . , n index the polls available for analysis. Each
of the polls is assumed generated by
yti = µti + νti, νti ∼ N [0, σ2ti] (B.1.1)
where yi is the results of poll i. The expectation µti is a linear combination of the latent
state αt and the house specific bias δj, thus
µti = αt + δj (B.1.2)
To model the change in voting intentions I use a random walk model
αt = αt−1 + t t ∼ N [0, ω2] (B.1.3)
with a distribution
α1 ∼ Unif(l, u) (B.1.4)
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where for H, to pick a party, l = .10 and u = .35, which brackets the historical range of
election results. With this model I assume that today’s level of support for H is the same
as yesterdays except for random shocks that come from a normal distribution with mean
zero and variance σ2.
B.2 The priors
Viewing the parameters as random and ascribing prior distributions to these is what
makes Bayesian statistics Bayesian. Equation B.1.3 and B.1.4 are the priors for the αt
parameters. For the house-effects δj I ascribe a normal prior with mean zero
δj ∼ N [0, d2] (B.2.1)
where d2 is a large value, which makes the normal distribution flat, so that the data
(the likelihood) will dominate the priors. This choice reflects the fact that I posit no
prior knowledge about the possible size and direction of the house specific biases. I
set d2 = 100 for all the J polling houses, to let the data dominate completely. For the
variance parameter ω2 I consider the precision φ = 1/ω2 and assign the precision a gamma
distribution,
f(φ) ∝ φa−1e−bφ (B.2.2)
The values I ascribe the parameters depend on what I view as the probable volatility of
party support for each individual party. To take Ap as an example, I set a = 5000 and
b = 1 so that the expected weekly volatility of party support for Ap is at on fifth of a
percentage point. This seems little, but since I am looping over the time series several
thousand times the total number of paths that {αt} take will provide a good description
of the uncertainty associated with the point estimates.
B.3 The posterior distribution
To estimate the model I implement it in a program for Bayesian analysis called JAGS,
which is short for Just Another Gibbs Sampler (Plummer, 2011). Gibbs sampling is a
Markov Chain Monte Carlo method for obtaining approximately independent samples
from a posterior distribution. Gibbs sampling is used for complex multivariate distribu-
tions for which the integral is difficult to compute. In short, the Gibbs sampler simulates
draws from the (univariate) conditional posterior distributions of the model parameters,
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Figure B.1: Equation B.1.1, B.1.2 and B.1.3 given as an Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG). The
arrows run from the parent nodes to the child nodes.
holding all the other parmeters fixed at their previously sampled values. After a certain
number of iterations the sequence of draws will converge to the target distribution we are
trying to simulate (Hoff, 2009, 97). Introductions to Gibbs sampling are found in all books
on Bayesian statistics. In order to sample from the conditional distributions of the model
parameters a description of these is required. To derive these distributions Propostion
5.2 in Jackman (2009, 227) is helpful. According to this proposition, if a statistical model
can be expressed as a directed acyclic graph G then the conditional density of the node
θj in the graph is
f(θj|G \ θj) ∝ f(θj|parents[θj])×∏
τ∈children[θj ]
f(τ |parents[τ ]) (B.3.1)
where \ is the set-theoretic difference.1 In Figure B.1 I show the DAG of the Gamma-
Normal model as defined above. When a DAG is used to characterize a Bayesian statisitcal
model the circular nodes represents the stochastic quantities, while the square nodes are
non-stochastic (Jackman, 2009, 226). The arrows in the DAG run from the parent nodes
to the child nodes. As seen in the Figure the observed poll results yti are the children of
the latent states αt, the house effects δj and the variance σ
2
ti. This last parameter σ
2
ti is in a
square box, and is considered non-stochastic. By this I mean that I consider σ2ti as a given
feature of the poll that gives the precision of the measurement, and more importantly, no
prior is ascribed to this parameter. With the DAG the conditional distribution of posterior
1If A and B are sets then the set theoretic difference is defined by A \B = {a|a ∈ A, a /∈ B}.
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can be derived. Because the model involves extensive use of the Normal distribution
it is convenient to derive the conditional distribution f(x|a) when x ∼ N [µ, σ2] and
















we get via Bayes Theorem that









































































































With this results at hand it is a matter of insertion to derive the following two conditional
posterior distributions. First, the conditional posterior distribution of f(αt|G \αt). From
the DAG we see that parents of αt are αt−1 and ω
2, while its children are αt+1 and yi,
this gives
f(αt|G \ αt) ∝ f(αt;αt−1, ω2)f(αt+1;αt, , ω2)f(yi;µt,i, σ2) (B.3.4)
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where
αt ∼ N [αt−1, ω2] (B.3.5)
αt+1 ∼ N [αt, ω2] (B.3.6)
so that these can be treated as x and µ, then multiplying these two distributions results













Multiplying this distribution by
yi − δj ∼ N [αt, σ2]


















Now, the house effects. The parent distribution of δj is its prior given in Equation ??,
and the childre of δj is all the poll results published by polling house j. Let Pj be the set
of all polls published by polling house j. Given that the conditional posterior distribution
for the house effects δj is given by

















yi − αt,i − δj,i
σ2i
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= (1 + d2)
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i∈P
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Lastly, the parameter giving the day-to-day variability in the latent state, namely φ =
1/ω2. This parameter was ascribed a gamma prior. As seen in Figure B.1 the children of
φ are all the αt parameters. The posterior distribution of φ is then


























B.4 Implementation in JAGS





Sp[i] ~ dnorm(alphaSp[week[i]] + houseSp[org[i]],precSp[i])
Krf[i] ~ dnorm(alphaKrf[week[i]] + houseKrf[org[i]],precKrf[i])
V[i] ~ dnorm(alphaV[week[i]] + houseV[org[i]],precV[i])
H[i] ~ dnorm(alphaH[week[i]] + houseH[org[i]],precH[i])











## sum-to-zero constraint on house effects
houseA[1] <- -sum(houseA[2:NHOUSES]);houseSv[1] <- -sum(houseSv[2:NHOUSES])
houseSp[1] <- -sum(houseSp[2:NHOUSES]);houseKrf[1] <- -sum(houseKrf[2:NHOUSES])



















houseA[i] ~ dnorm(0,.01);houseSv[i] ~ dnorm(0,.01)
houseSp[i] ~ dnorm(0,.01);houseKrf[i] ~ dnorm(0,.01)
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Appendix C
The DM-model
The complications that one encounters when working with a Dirichlet-Multinomial model
in a DLM setting are different from those of the Gamma-Normal model derived above.
While the dynamical part of the Dirichlet-Multinomial model is less intuitive than for the
former model, the derivation of the posterior distribution is very straightforward. In the
following two sections I present the model and discuss my solution to using this model in
a dynamic setting. Then I show the Python-script that implements the DM-model as a
DLM.
C.1 The model and the posterior distribution
In Section 4.2 we saw that when using the Dirichlet-Multinomial model the observations
are transformed to the actual number of respondents that said they had the intention to
vote for party k = 1, . . . , 8. Thus, the time-series is a sequence of count vectors
yt = (yt1, yt2, yt3, yt4, yt5, yt6, yt7, yt8) (C.1.1)
where the elements take on integer values. The elements are the sum of respondents
who said they would vote for a given party in a given week/month. For example, if
three polls are fielded in the same week, with samples sizes equal to 1000, 1024 and
850, which report 15.6, 22.1 and 18 percent as the respective estimates for Frp, then
yt,F rp = 1000× 0.156 + 1024× 0.221 + 850× 0.18 = 535, where I have rounded off to the
nearest integer. I restate the probability mass function of the Multinomial distribution
here
p(yt1, . . . , yt8) =
nt!
yt8! · · · yt8!α
yt1
t1 · · ·αyt8t8 (C.1.2)
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For a full Bayesian specification of the model a prior must be assigned over the αtk’s.
The conjuagate prior distribution is the Dirichlet distribution with probability density
function
pi(αt1, . . . , αt8) =
Γ(bt1 + · · ·+ bt8)
Γ(bt1) · · ·Γ(bt8) α
bt1−1
t1 · · ·αbt8−1t8 (C.1.3)
where
∑8
k=1 αtk = 1 for all t. The posterior distribution is
f(αt1, . . . , αt1|yt) ∝ αyt1t1 · · ·αyt8t8 αbt1−1t1 · · ·αbt8−1t8 = αbt1+yt1−1t1 · · ·αbt8+yt8−1t8 (C.1.4)
which is also Dirichlet with parameters bt1 + yt1. There are two nice features of this
approach. First, the manner in which the count vectors are designed gives more weight
to poll esitimates that are based on large samples. Second, since the variance of the
Dirichlet distribution is decreasing in the size of its parameters, large sample sizes also
result in tighter HDRs. In order to specify the Dirichlet-Multinomial model in a DLM
setting there are two issues that need to be handled. First, contrary to the GN-model
where the posterior estimate of αt is readily used as prior at t + 1, things are not that
straightforward with the DM-model. The challenge is simply that the parameters used to
specify the Dirichlet prior distribution are the btk’s which are integers, while the estimates
obtained when sampling from the Dirichlet posterior are the αtk ∈ [0, 1]. To have a prior
at t + 1 the αtk’s must be translated to sensible integer values. A possible solution, that
would certainly work if I was not aiming at a moving target, would be to use the btk+ytk’s
as the parameters specifying my prior at t+1. But, since the targets of interest, the latent
states, are evolving through time this solution is only feasible if the value of the btk+ytk’s
are modelled as decaying with time. I propose a pragmatic solution: I assume that my
confidence in the location of the latent states is never lower than if I had just surveyed
thousand respondents. The αtk’s sampled from the posterior at t are therefore multiplied
by a thousand to become the parameters of the Dirichlet prior at t + 1. The scheme is
simply,
(bt+1,1, . . . , bt+1,8) = (αt1, . . . , αt8)× 1000
which means that for the points in time where I lack observations the parameters of the
posterior are equal to the parameters of the prior, save for the random-walk. In Figure A.1,
A.2 and A.3 it is easy to spot these points or periods of time where observations are lacking.
C.2 Implementing the DM-model in Python
Here is the Python script I have written to run the Dirichlet-Multinomial model.
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import random as r
import numpy as np
def multidiri(data,itrs,pseudonobs):
m = lambda x: np.linspace(0,0,len(data.T)*itrs).\
reshape(itrs,len(data.T))
A =m(’.’);Sv=m(’.’);Sp =m(’.’)
Krf =m(’.’);V =m(’.’);H =m(’.’);Frp=m(’.’)
others=m(’.’)
i = 0;g = lambda a,b:r.gammavariate(a,b)
h = lambda l,u:r.randint(l,u);avg=np.zeros(8)





for week in range(0,len(data.T)):
if week == 1:
post = data.T[week][1:] + prior
else:
















i += 1;print ’iteration %g’%i
print avg/float(itrs) # print Dirich params
return {’A’:A,’Sv’:Sv,’Sp’:Sp,’Krf’:Krf,’V’:V,\
’H’:H,’Frp’:Frp,’others’:others}
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Appendix D
Quadratic function
Here is the R code for the quadratic forecast function. It takes as arguments the points of
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Appendix E
Multinomial logit regression model
E.1 Model and priors
With
yt ∼ Multi(nt, αt1, αt2, . . . , αt8)
where αik represents the probability of the k’th party, and
∑8
k=1 αtk = 1. I follow
Gelman et al. (2004) and parametrize the model in terms of the of logarithm of the ratio
of the probability of each category relative to a baseline category. The categories are the
seven parties (plus others), where I have set Arbeiderpartiet (Ap) as the baseline. I label






= ηtk = (Xβk)t

















where β1 is set to zero. The priors over the βk’s are
βk ∼ N [bk,Σk] (E.1.2)
The covariance matrix Σk is the same for eight categories. It is matrix with 0.01 on
the diagonal and zeros off the diagonal. The bk vectors are specific for each of the eight
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categories. My priors for these are
bSv = (0, .2, .1, .1,−.2)
bSp = (0, 0, .04, .04, 0)
bKrf = (0, 0,−.2,−.2, .1)
bV = (0,−.2, .2, .1, .1)
bH = (0,−.4, .4, .4, .1)
bFrp = (0,−.4, .4, .4, .1)
with all zeros in the vector for the category ”others”. The elements are in the order
of the variables in the JAGS-script below. To estimate this model the Gibbs sampler
was run for 2 050 000 iterations where the first 50 000 were discarded as burn in. Each
200’th iteration of the remaining two millon were kept for inference. Visual inspection
of the trace plot of each of the parameters indicated that the Markov Chain produced
by the Gibbs sampler had converged on its stationary distribution. No formal tests were
conducted. The coefficients displayed in Table E.1 are the means and the 2.5 and 97.5
percentiles of the sampled values.
E.2 Implementation in JAGS
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beta[1,e] <- 0 # identifying restriction.
}
# separate priors for left and right parties
for(k in 2:8){








































Sv Sp Krf V H Frp others
Intercept -0.89 -2.0378 -1.1619 -2.023 -0.6527 0.642 -1.6673
[-0.924,-0.8473] [-2.0759,-1.9996] [-1.199,-1.1247] [-2.077,-1.9697] [-0.679,-0.6259] [0.6062,0.6784] [-1.7255,-1.6083]
Unemployment -0.0612 0.1612 -0.2057 -0.0574 0.0478 -0.251 -0.1925
[-0.0705,-0.0517] [0.1526,0.1696] [-0.2144,-0.1969] [-0.07,-0.0451] [0.0415,0.0542] [-0.2597,-0.2419] [-0.2069,-0.1783]
CPI growth -0.0624 0.0078 -0.1097 -0.0878 0.0872 -0.2896 -0.1307
[-0.0675,-0.0574] [0.0029,0.0124] [-0.1142,-0.1053] [-0.0944,-0.0811] [0.0839,0.0906] [-0.2946,-0.2846] [-0.1386,-0.1231]
GDP growth -0.0095 0.0102 0.0662 0.0356 -0.0398 0.0015 0.022
[-0.0127,-0.0062] [0.0068,0.0136] [0.0632,0.0692] [0.0312,0.04] [-0.0422,-0.0375] [-0.0011,0.0041] [0.0173,0.0265]
Left dummy -0.1013 -0.0149 0.6031 0.1638 -0.1962 0.2118 0.3305
[-0.1276,-0.0749] [-0.0415,0.0113] [0.5802,0.6262] [0.1276,0.1979] [-0.215,-0.1787] [0.1876,0.236] [0.2926,0.3679]
Table E.1: Multinomial logit regression model with Ap as baseline. Estimated on the last ten elections. Parentheses give the 95% HDRs of
the posterior density of each parameter.
Appendix F
Implementing Saint-Lague¨s method
The Python class that calculates Saint-Lague¨s method is looped over a list of lists that
contains the percentage shares of the seven (plus) one parties. In addition I supply, a
data set containing the county wise deviances, data on the turnout in each county for the
election of 2009, and the number of mandates from each county for the election of 2013.
F.1 Python script
import random as r














for i in range(0,len(divisors)):





for i,j in enumerate(table):
if j == max(table):
got_one = i
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return got_one







for x in got_them:
if x in np.linspace(0,to2,by2):
ap += 1
elif x in np.linspace(0,to2,by2)+1:
sv += 1
elif x in np.linspace(0,to2,by2)+2:
sp += 1
elif x in np.linspace(0,to2,by2)+3:
krf += 1
elif x in np.linspace(0,to2,by2)+4:
v += 1
elif x in np.linspace(0,to2,by2)+5:
h += 1





Ap = %s, Sv = %s, Sp = %s, Krf = %s












if len(a) != len(b):
print ’Incompatible tuples!’
out = np.zeros(8)
for i in range(0,len(a)):
out[i] = a[i]*b[i]
return out
for s in range(0,19):
if self.fylke_name == self.all19[s]:
fylkes_forecast = tuple_mult(self.fylkes_factors[s]\
,nationalforecast)




















for e in range(0,len(self.nationalforecast)):




negs = ’negative diffs’













def total(self): # adding them together
diffs = self.diffs
county = self.countymand
return county+diffs
